U.S.-SOVIET RELATIONS: AN AGENDA FOR THE FUTURE

A REPORT TO THE FORTY-FIRST PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES

FOREIGN POLICY INSTITUTE
SCHOOL OF ADVANCED INTERNATIONAL STUDIES
THE JOHNS HOPKINS UNIVERSITY
WASHINGTON, D.C.
The Johns Hopkins Foreign Policy Institute (FPI) was founded in 1980 and serves as the research center for the School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS) in Washington, D.C. The FPI is a meeting place for SAIS faculty members and students as well as for government analysts, policymakers, diplomats, journalists, business leaders, and other specialists in international affairs. In addition to conducting research on policy-related international issues, the FPI sponsors conferences, seminars, and roundtables.

Current research activities at the FPI span the complete spectrum of American foreign policy and international affairs. In the project on "U.S.-Soviet Relations: An Agenda for the Future," FPI fellows and outside experts evaluate the recent evolution of U.S.-Soviet relations and develop original ideas for increased superpower cooperation in new and established areas. Through the project on foreign policy consensus, the FPI seeks to advance the national dialogue on central issues of U.S. foreign policy; specific recommendations are prepared by selected experts and endorsed by a bipartisan commission for wide distribution in the policy community.

Other current FPI programs examine the impact of the landmark Goldwater-Nichols defense reorganization act; the relation of arms control to force structure and military-political doctrine; the politics of international terrorism; the role of the media in foreign policy; American and Soviet national security policymaking; and other leading international issues. These programs are usually directed by FPI fellows.

FPI publications include the SAIS Review, a semiannual journal of foreign affairs, which is edited by SAIS students; the FPI Papers in International Affairs, a monograph series designed to make public the best and most cogent scholarly work on foreign policy and defense issues; the FPI Policy Briefs, a series of analyses of immediate or emerging foreign-policy issues; the FPI Case Studies, a series designed to teach analytical negotiating skills; and the FPI Policy Consensus Reports, which present recommendations on a series of critical foreign policy issues.

For additional information regarding FPI activities, write to: FPI Publications Program, School of Advanced International Studies, The Johns Hopkins University, 1119 Massachusetts Avenue, N.W., Washington, D.C. 20036-2297.

© January 1989 by The Johns Hopkins Foreign Policy Institute.
All rights reserved.
Printed in the United States of America.
CONTENTS

Part I: THE FUTURE OF U.S.-SOVIET RELATIONS:
A CONSENSUS STATEMENT

Part II: AN AGENDA FOR THE FUTURE:
TWENTY PROPOSALS

Economic Relations
1. A (Partially) Convertible Ruble
2. A Soviet Special Economic Zone
3. A New Export Regime for Information Technologies
4. Rethinking Business with the USSR

Science and Medicine
5. Combined Remote-Sensing Observations of the Earth from Space
6. A Radio Telescope Larger than Earth
7. Joint Development of an Inherently Safe Nuclear Reactor
8. Cooperation in Surgical Oncology

Domestic Policy
9. Demonstration Centers for Educational Reform
10. An American College in Moscow
11. Cooperation to Protect the Environment and Conserve Resources
12. A Bilateral Endowment for the Arts and Humanities

Defense and Arms Control
13. Converting Nuclear Missiles for Peaceful Use
14. Strategic Information Exchanges as Confidence-Building Measures
15. Military Liaisons Between NATO and the Warsaw Pact
16. A $100 Billion Understanding

Foreign Policy
17. A Soviet-American Peace Corps
18. U.S.-Soviet Cooperation on Terrorism
20. An Advisory Council on American-Soviet Relations

Part III: CONTRIBUTORS
PART I

THE FUTURE OF U.S.-SOVIET RELATIONS

The general thrust (though not every sentence) of this statement on The Future of U.S.-Soviet Relations was endorsed by:

Richard J. Barnet
Seweryn Blaler
Cott D. Blucker
Barry M. Blechman
Stephen F. Cohen
William E. Colby
Arthur Macy Cox
Randall Forsberg
Alton Frye
Raymond L. Garthoff
Archibald L. Gillies
Marshall I. Goldman
Roger D. Hansen
Frank Von Hippel
Arnold Horelick

Robert E. Hunter
Spurgeon M. Keeny, Jr.
Catherine M. Kelleher
Geoffrey Kemp
William H. Kincaide
Robert Legvold
Robert J. Lieber
George Liska
Michael Mandelbaum
Janne E. Nolan
Joseph S. Nye, Jr.
Bruce Parrott
Simon Serfaty
Jeremy J. Stone
Robert W. Tucker

Richard H. Ullman

Since March 1985, Moscow's new leadership has issued increasingly radical calls for economic and political reform in the Soviet Union. These calls and corresponding actions are pointing to directions generally more compatible with long-standing Western interests, and more responsive to Western values, than under any previous Soviet leadership. Both in declaratory policy as well as in fact they invite the next U.S. administration to explore whatever opportunities may thereby exist for further improvements -- and even breakthroughs -- in U.S.-Soviet relations.

To be sure, the stability and continuity of changes now taking place in Soviet outlook and policies remain uncertain -- pending the resolution of obstacles of history, geography, mass apathy, and opposition within the party. But the United States cannot simply wait for those uncertainties to be resolved; there are risks in any action, but no less in failing to act.
Our interests must remain the essential foundation for any desirable and sustainable American action. Yet attention must also focus on the intersections of U.S. and Soviet interests and objectives, common and conflicting. With regard to the fundamentals of security, for example, what may be new in the relationship between the two powers is not so much their priority interests (including the prevention of nuclear war) but a more open and flexible outlook on how negotiations can best serve those interests.

Under the leadership of Mikhail Gorbachev, the Soviet Union has shown a keener appreciation of common and parallel interests, as well as a more realistic assessment of the world and its interdependent political and economic processes, than in the past. This is new and significant. The Gorbachev leadership also has shown a more realistic awareness of the limitations of many traditional means of exerting influence in the world, including limitations on the efficacy of military means and political means relying on military power. This, too, is new and significant.

In advancing proposals of our own, therefore, we should not be limited by rigid perceptions of what Moscow can accept; willingness to cooperate should be imaginatively probed so that Soviet flexibility can be examined fully. Thus, the conception of security newly enunciated by Soviet leaders raises the possibility of improving on the security brought by unilateral decisions on military forces, through agreements on arms constraints and reductions that would be much more effective in achieving a stable and secure balance than heretofore. In the case of strategic forces, Soviet leaders appear prepared to go at least as far as the United States is in that direction -- either, as in START I, toward a nominal 50 percent reduction or a real 90 percent reduction in strategic nuclear weapons and up to 100 percent in all other nuclear weapons. Total elimination of nuclear weapons may well not be in the Western interest at this time, but the West can probably set the level and range of nuclear weaponry deemed necessary, and negotiate down to that level.

In conventional arms reductions the picture is more complex. The extent of the Soviet interest and readiness to act remains to be tested, but so does the Western position, on the basis of positions consonant with and enhancing Western security. The risk is not that we will go too far in our positions, but that we will not go far enough to make credible an avowed and publicly supported interest in arms control. An even greater risk would be to invite far-reaching reductions on the assumption that we would be calling a Soviet bluff. The negotiations on intermediate-range nuclear forces (INF) have shown that we must avoid making tactically attractive proposals whose implications have not been thought through on the assumption the Soviet government is certain to reject them.

The Soviet public commitment to accept asymmetrical reductions to eliminate superiorities in conventional arms on the two sides, and to restructure deployed military forces in Europe to reduce their capability for offensive action while maintaining or enhancing their defensive capability, is especially significant. While there would be very great difficulties in reaching agreement on measures for implementing such a concept, it has an intrinsic attraction and cannot simply be ignored.

It would be wise for the new President to hold an early meeting with key congressional leaders to work toward a new consensus on defense policy on as broad a bipartisan basis as possible. To permit a coherent national security policy that includes both arms control and U.S. military-force structure, such a consensus should address: what well-balanced retaliatory forces will be needed to provide stable deterrence after the Strategic Arms Reduction Talks (START) force reductions; what posture and doctrine will be followed with the European allies in pursuing negotiations toward a treaty with the Soviets for substantial conventional force reductions in Europe and what U.S. and allied force structures should be with and without such a treaty; and what verifiable assurances would be required to proceed with further agreements on nuclear testing, chemical weapons, and the like. With respect to space-based ballistic missile defense, the very least that needs to be addressed includes the pace and nature of research and testing.

The new President should also consider a summit meeting of Western leaders at an early time for the purpose of fashioning a clearer and broader consensus, perhaps on the
fortieth anniversary of the founding of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization in April 1989. A meeting with Gorbachev need not await a major arms reduction or other agreement, but it should occur after the general line of a policy strategy has been established in Washington and with the allies. Altogether, the new President should be able to articulate early his firm dedication to supporting American interests, if and when necessary by resisting Soviet or other challenges, but if and when possible through cooperative action. The United States should not be lacking in readiness for competition and cooperation.

An American strategy for developing relations with the Soviet Union must take the present state of the relationship as its point of departure. It must also be grounded in the political realities of the situation in the Soviet Union, the United States, and the world. While it would be self-defeating to assume too little leeway for creative change, it would also be of little avail to assume a tabula rasa. Uncertainties as to Gorbachev’s purposes and intentions, and as to his capabilities to succeed or even to remain in power, are valid considerations. However, inasmuch as any American policy should be based on American interests and objectives and constrained only by Soviet performance, there is no need to “gamble” on Gorbachev’s future. The United States should take positions, advance proposals, and agree on provisions, that stand so long as the corresponding conditions stand on the other side. There is no need to take positions that would disadvantage the United States if the Soviet Union suddenly changed course. Moreover, even if Soviet leaders regarded it as temporary only, a sustained period of relative Soviet restraint might have international consequences that could not be reversed easily and could condition more permanently Moscow’s understanding and formulation of its foreign policy goals.

Thus, while the future of the political situation in the Soviet Union is only one element of critical importance for the future, we should work with whatever it offers that will serve American interests in the areas of security and arms control, regional conflicts, trade, and human rights:

1. Security and Arms Control: Taking the START negotiations as they stand on January 20, 1989, the new administration should avoid another wholesale “rethinking” of the process inherited from the outgoing administration. The current outline of a START agreement is good, and deserves to be maintained. A breakdown in START that is, or is perceived to be, U.S.-inspired would compromise prospects for a domestic consensus on strategic policy and relations with the Soviet Union at the very beginning of the new administration, and would also do serious damage to alliance cohesion.

Strategic arms agreements must be so designed as to strengthen deterrence and enhance the predictability and stability of the strategic nuclear competition. Even more than in the case of the INF treaty, verification procedures for START will be crucial in obtaining political acceptance as well as in assuring detection of violations that might dangerously affect the strategic balance. Some of the innovative INF verification procedures seem to provide useful and encouraging precedents.

Papering over disagreements about strategic defenses in order to facilitate a START agreement is a prescription for real trouble down the road. In the arithmetic of deterrence, the stronger the defenses on either side, the greater the need for sufficiency of weapons on the other side to overwhelm those defenses. On strategic defenses, the Soviets, the U.S. administration, and the U.S. Congress must play by the same rules, and those rules should be made as explicit as possible.

The United States should be prepared to agree on a ten-year recommitment to the Anti-Ballistic Missile treaty, as it was signed in 1972, coupled with new and continuing consultations on the precise limits of development testing permitted by that treaty or by new agreements between the two powers. The new consultations should be clearly understood to include discussion of proposals by both sides for possible amendments of the 1972 treaty. These amendments could tighten or relax particular limits.

Completing START should make it easier for the United States and its allies to seek large and asymmetrical reductions in conventional arms. That these will be especially difficult to achieve is all but certain. Yet failure to make politically viable, militarily
desirable, and strategically sensible proposals in this area would leave the initiative in Soviet hands, and probably invite precisely the kind of political and military dilemmas for the United States and the alliance that avoiding the issue tries to skirt.

The key lies in finding changes to the present military balance through some combination of force structure and weapons programs decisions with restructuring arms reductions and redeployments that will meet the legitimate defensive requirements of both sides. Neither side will truly concede that the other faces a threat that requires any deterrent or offensive measures, but it is legitimate for both to prepare against perceived potential threats. Both countries should, however, seek to fashion their own military focus for deterrence and defense in a way that will present the least threat to the other side. Gorbachev's proposals, of course, reflect the Soviet view. The U.S. responsibility in the Western alliance is to advance proposals that would enhance Western security without threatening the Warsaw Pact. If both sides really seek to meet the criterion of non-threatening defense, agreement may become possible on measures that would enhance the security of both sides.

This, however, is not the place to develop the specifics of any such proposal for conventional forces. Suffice it to add that Europe remains the most important regional issue involving the United States and the Soviet Union. It is there that the Cold War began, and it is there that can still be found the focus of the military-political competition between the two global powers. Opportunities to pursue meaningful changes that would scale down this competition should be explored, especially if the Soviet Union gradually makes an explicit distinction between the requirements for its security and the internal governance of the countries of Eastern Europe.

2. Regional Conflicts: Military security concerns are the central element in the relationship between the United States and the USSR; their alleviation would open the way to fuller attainment of other forms of normalization of relations. This includes not only concerns over the strategic military balance, and over the military counterposition in Europe, but also over the use of direct and indirect military means in what are now termed "regional conflicts" in the Third World. Such local conflicts have played a large role in shaping American relations with the Soviet Union.

A greater appreciation of the significance of these matters for the stability of the overall relationship appears to have been shown by Gorbachev. There are many reasons for such a change, some of which may prove to be transitory, some more fundamental. U.S. assistance to insurgencies resisting Soviet-supported regimes may well have been an element. So has an apparent reassessment, occasionally argued at the last party conference in Moscow, that the resources required by such incursions in the Third World may not be consistent with making the Soviet Union a viable and modern state.

For whatever reasons, the Soviets now often see some of their apparent advances of the 1970s as costly and unsuccessful in advancing Soviet ideological leadership. Accordingly, the United States should pursue negotiations on some regional conflicts to facilitate settlements that local conditions make ripe, and probe Soviet intentions in other areas of conflict where the influence available to both countries could be used in parallel. Serious diplomatic consultations between the United States and the Soviet Union, expanding on a process already under way, can help reduce risks of U.S.-Soviet confrontation in future regional crises, and can help increase chances of settling current crises.

Maintaining momentum does not mean that the United States can expect to set and enforce the boundaries of permissible differences between, and actions by, the United States and the USSR in the Third World. But it does mean that the United States should continue to deal with each situation on its merits. In Southeast Asia, we should continue to support the more responsible contenders in Kampuchea, not only to keep pressure on the Vietnamese to withdraw, but also to prevent the return of the Khmer Rouge. In Southern Africa, we should seek to conclude and strengthen agreements between Angola and South Africa over Namibia. In Central America, the peace process should be given strong support, including assurances to countries that raise no external threat to others. This latter point includes a clear ban on any Soviet base in Nicaragua, and at least limits on Soviet military assistance to the region.
In the Middle East, the Arab-Israeli conflict should be steered on to a renewed peace process, not excluding an international peace conference with Soviet participation at a point where that could contribute to a resolution of the problems of the area. But the United States should also ask that Soviet influence be used -- especially with Syria and the PLO -- to facilitate the peace process.

As the Iran-Iraq war winds down, and in the context of eight years during which the United States and Soviet Union at least tacitly cooperated to prevent it from widening, U.S.-Soviet cooperation to limit arms exports to the Persian Gulf might be in order. There, as elsewhere in the Third World, reduced competition with the Soviet Union ought to be used as an opportunity for both countries and their allies to review ways whereby limits to their arms sales could be agreed upon, enforced, and verified.

The need for such limits has become especially urgent with respect to ballistic missiles and chemical warfare agent components.

Finally, building on whatever may be achieved in Afghanistan, Angola, Cambodia, and elsewhere, the U.S.-Soviet dialogue could move on to the exploration of possibly convergent interests in stabilizing other potential hot spots that may show signs of erupting in the future. In some cases, increased use of United Nations machinery may become a convenient way to seek and implement such agreements.

3. Economic Relations: Encouraging the Soviet leadership to continue to move in promising directions can be one of our objectives, but we cannot think that we are somehow capable of designing Soviet economic policies from the outside. Here, as elsewhere, the U.S. objective is to promote policies that can best serve U.S. interests. In that context, we must remember that gains from increased economic interaction do not merely result from immediate and tangible profits, but are also gathered as and when the Soviets acquire a dependence on the connections they form with the market economies.

There remain in the Soviet Union some substantial constraints that limit U.S.-Soviet and, perhaps to a lesser extent, even Soviet-West European trade. Price reforms, which are the key to the entire process of economic and social reform in the Soviet Union and elsewhere in Eastern Europe will be difficult and slow to achieve, and fully convertible currency will come even later. The range of what the Soviets can sell to the West is very limited. And the Soviets themselves may be concerned about the risks of a political and economic dependence on the West that might be reappraised with every new crisis.

The United States should continue to strive to maintain a firm Western position in the sixteen-nation Coordinating Committee (COCOM) excluding East-West trade in strategically significant high-end and militarily useful technology. Western countries should continue to review the specific list of excluded items to keep it effective in its purpose, but no more restrictive than necessary to that purpose. Higher walls around a narrower set of technologies would be both more effective and more enforceable. Only on this basis can a cohesive Western position be maintained. In this last context, Japan's firmer participation in the COCOM process would be especially useful.

The Soviets have indicated their interest in participating in international economic organizations, including the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, the World Bank, the Asian Development Bank, and the International Monetary Fund. We should not oppose, indeed we can even welcome, this interest. But it should be understood as a condition of membership that Soviet leaders be ready to accept and accommodate the practices of these organizations -- however complex it may be to devise criteria for reform in, and cooperation with, non-market economies. And second, we must be convinced that there is no Soviet intention or little opportunity to subvert the goals of these organizations -- a contingency that need not be feared unduly since Soviet economic leverage is so limited.

Finally, for both economic and political reasons the United States should refrain from exerting undue pressure on other Western countries that grant substantial trade credits to the Soviet Union and countries in Eastern Europe. In fact, the United States should itself review the conditions under which it would drop its current restrictive
legislation denying government credit guarantees and normal trade conditions in order to align its economic position with that of the Western consensus. Such a review -- which would include Jackson-Vanik and most-favored-nation status -- should relate U.S. policy to an assessment of broad systemic changes in the Soviet Union across a wide range of political, social, and humanitarian indicators, rather than relate particular U.S. decisions to specific human rights performance by the USSR that may not be part of a broader trend.

4. Human Rights: Concern for the status of basic human rights has now become an established feature of the U.S.-Soviet agenda, and the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (the Helsinki process) has also placed this subject on the broader East-West agenda. This is a tribute to U.S. and Western persistence. But it also reflects Moscow's recognition that refusal to discuss human rights has become counterproductive.

There have been welcome changes in the condition of human rights in the Soviet Union. But much of what is needed still lies ahead. The United States and the West are deeply engaged in the process of encouraging broad societal change in the Soviet Union. Indeed, this engagement has grown as the communications revolution and Soviet glasnost have dramatically increased the exposure of Soviet citizens to the outside world. We can at least marginally abet this process by showing sympathetic interest in evidence of progress and continuing to encourage democratic forces in the USSR (and Eastern Europe), but also by criticizing reverses and publicizing remaining obstacles. Most generally, contacts that demonstrate to the people of the Soviet bloc the advantages of free choice, economic and political, for making society modern and functioning may help point their leaders in directions that we favor. In any case, our lecturing or hectoring them will have less impact than if they see that their own successful modernization can come only through a system of economic incentives and some degree of political, artistic, cultural, and religious pluralism.

In the area of human rights, if our aim is to encourage the removal of the societal abnormalities that have divided East from West -- excessive secrecy, denial of basic freedoms, control of information, people, and thought -- we should recognize the positive role that example and contact can play. The United States should, with its allies, encourage a continued expansion of exchanges and joint projects in a broad range of scientific, medical, artistic, cultural, and educational areas, both publicly and privately sponsored. Such projects -- related to proposals that are varied enough to leave policymakers with ample room for choice -- can be construed as the perennials that will endure an ever-possible change of seasons in American-Soviet relations.

In sum, the United States should use the occasion of a policy review by the new administration to build on the present state of U.S. policy toward the Soviet Union, and move to improve relations with the Soviet Union insofar as can be done on a basis serving Western interests. There appear to be new opportunities, particularly in the sphere of security enhancement through arms reductions and other agreed measures. While maintaining strategic and other deterrent forces at necessary levels, we should probe where negotiations can reduce both the levels of military confrontation and reciprocal perceptions of a threat, and thus provide more stable security for both sides. On that foundation, a broader normalization of relations would follow.

Producing a consensus for a long-term, sophisticated and mature national policy that makes it possible to encourage change in a modernizing and moderating Soviet Union, while guarding the fundamental security interests of the United States and the West will not be easy. At times, our leaders will have to show the courage to say "Yes" to perceived opportunities. At all times, persuasiveness will be required to sustain the public support that remains a precondition to a consistent and sustainable policy toward the Soviet Union.
PART II

AN AGENDA FOR THE FUTURE

In 1988, The Johns Hopkins Foreign Policy Institute of the School of Advanced International Studies launched a nationwide search for innovative ideas for increased cooperation between the United States and the Soviet Union.

More than 225 proposals were received from academic experts, active and retired foreign service officers, doctors, lawyers, scientists, union leaders, businessmen, architects, peace activists, students, and housekeepers from 40 different states.

The Agenda presented here includes only summaries of the twenty proposals that were selected by the FPI from these numerous submissions for further development. The full proposals, as written by their respective authors, have been published individually and are available from the FPI upon request.

ECONOMIC RELATIONS

1. A (Partially) Convertible Ruble

Steven Rosefeld

Partial convertibility of the ruble is most likely to be achieved with Western cooperation. If extended, such cooperation would provide the United States (and the West) with significant trade benefits. And it would also provide leverage over Soviet conduct in other arenas.

A strategy of cooptive integration of the Soviet Union into the world economic community can be pursued as a complement for deterrence. To be achieved, such
integration requires a fundamental change in the Soviet economy: a mechanism that can make the ruble competitively convertible within the limits of the prevailing regime. Soviet interest in achieving ruble convertibility on their own—an expansion of the scale of their commerce and enhance its efficiency— is known. Yet, the success of this reform depends on Western cooperation, whose subordinate goal would be a concomitant improvement in Western material welfare brought about through increased East-West trade.

Convertibility would serve to advance American commercial interests. Under current institutional arrangements the Soviet government enjoys a monopoly of trade that enables it to discriminate against its trading partners in two ways: by setting the exchange rate above the competitive level, and through confidential bilateral negotiated transactions designed to allow price discrimination. As matters now stand, most-favored-nation tariff exemptions would give the Soviets competitive access to the U.S. market without a meaningful quid pro quo. Ruble convertibility would eliminate this problem.

The simplest approach to ruble convertibility would be for the Soviets themselves to abolish legal prohibitions barring Soviet citizens and unauthorized state agents from exchanging rubles with foreigners, and parallel restrictions preventing foreigners from holding or spending rubles obtained from unapproved sources. This approach is eminently feasible but unrealistic. It would subvert the state's economic priorities by allowing disapproved parties to influence the level and composition of foreign trade.

However, this difficulty can be circumvented by restricting foreign market participation in varying degrees. For example, the State Price Committee could continue to set output and factor prices, but a few selected agents would be permitted to engage in international trade, allowing managers of approved enterprises to make their own import and export decisions. In this case though, the ruble would still play only a perfunctory role because international commerce would be conducted entirely with hard currency receipts—the proceeds of unauthorized export sales.

Real competitive commercial convertibility begins when the state and/or selected state agents can purchase domestic hard currency assets to would-be state import agents in accordance with the forces of supply and demand. The easiest way to accomplish this would be to permit selected state agents to bid competitively for hard currencies held by exporters or the state banks, but without authorizing the direct sales of rubles to foreigners.

Rudimentary free convertibility could be achieved merely by allowing potential importers to exchange a portion of their ruble holdings for domestically held foreign-currency balances on a competitive, negotiated basis. Firms and other agents with relatively strong demand for hard currencies would be prepared to outbid their rivals, with rubles being exchanged for foreign currencies at diverse prices until the sanctioned international auction market is cleared.

This process would broaden the import market, and stimulate exports and entrepreneurship, without infringing on the taboo against free currency exchange between domestic entities and foreigners. In addition, if multiple foreign entities (state and private banks) were allowed to participate in the internal Soviet hard-currency market, a convertible market for the ruble with flexible exchange rates would automatically develop in the West in the usual competitive fashion.

Partial convertibility would assure Soviet fears that their domestic economy might become captive of the vagaries of the world market, and that the internal hard currency auction would be inefficient and counterproductive. With regard to external disturbances, most Soviet imports and export activities are transacted at world market prices, and the introduction of this new foreign-trade mechanism would extend such practice. If augumented import demand adversely depreciated the ruble, the central authorities could either curtail their import programs or alter the incentive controls.

The implementation of this initiative would take place in stages. First, economic and national security specialists would evaluate whether such a strategy is viable and contains proper safeguards. Second, the bipartisan support of key congressional leaders would be sought. Third, after these requirements are met, official approaches would be made to Soviet authorities. Fourth, if they are amenable, a conference of Soviet and U.S. experts would be held to develop a concrete strategy for implementing the policy. And fifth, the recommendations of this conference would be reported to the responsible authorities of both countries for further deliberation and final action.

Bringing the Soviet Union into the world economic community through partial convertibility of the ruble would open the Soviet economy to Western influence, and provide commercial benefits at limited risks, since trade restrictions could still be renewed and expanded, credit curtailed, and U.S. participation in the ruble exchange market banned, thereby degrading its efficiency.

2. A Soviet Special Economic Zone

Charles E. Ziegler

The United States should encourage and facilitate the development of a special economic zone in the Soviet Far East.

In September 1988, Mikhail Gorbachev confirmed his interest in the establishment of a special economic zone centered around the port city of Vladivostok in the Soviet Far East. Previously, this area had been singled out for growth targets higher than elsewhere in the country, for a range of industries that included consumer services and export capabilities. Now, the special economic zone evoked by Gorbachev contemplates a preferential treatment in custom duties and licensing, in foreign economic deals and related taxation, and in reduced fees paid for natural and labor resources.

The area seems well chosen for such an experiment. The Soviet Far East is rich in oil, natural gas, timber, coal and various nonfuel minerals. With the Baikal-Amur railway close to completion, and with the port capacity of the nearby city of Vostichny recently enhanced, the transportation infrastructure of the region has been improved, adding
further to the geographical advantages of the region -- close as it is to the American West Coast, Japan, and the newly industrialized countries of the Pacific basin.

Encouraging and facilitating the establishment of the Soviet special economic zone would be a useful course for the United States to follow. To the extent that economic growth follows the light consumer goods pattern projected in Soviet plans for the area, and as long as the United States and Asian countries follow guidelines established by the sixteen-nation Coordinating Committee that regulates East-West trade (COCOM), the projected special economic zone need not conflict with U.S. security interests in the Pacific.

Viewing the process sought by the Soviet leadership as non-threatening would help make U.S. equipment and management skills available to extract, process, and export the natural resources available in the Soviet Far East, and such a natural complementarity of economic interests would be conducive to new opportunities for investment through joint enterprises and for the sales of American products to the USSR.

In the near term, U.S. support for such a project would not require such steps as the guarantee of credits, the revocation of the Jackson-Vanik amendment that links trade with Soviet emigration policies, or the relaxation of COCOM’s restrictions on the transfer of high technology, defense-applicable equipment to the USSR. Yet, U.S. firms that enter into long-term arrangements with the Soviets for the development of the region would need reassurances that future U.S. administrations would not impose unilateral economic sanctions.

Finally, U.S. participation in a successful Soviet special economic zone would help demonstrate the efficacy of relaxing controls over central planning, strengthen the proponents of market mechanisms and private enterprise, and give added impetus to more extensive Soviet integration into the world economy. These in turn would help achieve long-standing foreign policy objectives by contributing to the emergence of a Soviet Union that is increasingly governed by consumer preferences and more open to individual initiative.

3. A New Export Regime for Information Technologies

Judith A. Thornton

While maintaining export controls for some important high-end computer technologies that have direct military significance, the United States should end export restrictions on low-technology commodity computers.

Computers and related information technologies are unique in their importance to a modern industrial economy. They are unique in their pervasiveness, in the dynamism of the underlying technologies, and in their cost consequences for other technologies. They are central to modern finance and distribution, and to the design and manufacture of products in modern industry. And they are also direct and significant inputs into modern military systems.

Although it has the capability for being self-sufficient for its priority military and strategic needs, the Soviet Union lags behind the West to an extraordinary extent in its ability to supply the civilian economy with computer services. In the past, the Soviet performance has been hampered by self-imposed difficulties in acquiring and assimilating technology, the paucity of opportunities for Western businesses in the Soviet market, and Western export controls.

These limits are now being eased. Some, but not all, of the Soviets’ self-imposed obstacles are being eliminated. The high priority given to the electronic technologies in current Soviet plans offers Western businesses opportunities for increased sales of computer products (however constrained by hard-currency earnings and the extent of Western credits). And even after substantial efforts by the U.S. government to narrow the scope and speed the process of export controls, the quick pace of technological change in the industry and the rapid growth of international competition in information technologies continue to outrun the ability of U.S. policymakers to keep export controls consistent with changing realities.

Although export controls for some important high-end computer technologies that have direct military significance should be preserved, it is also essential that the United States devote greater attention to the consistency of multilateral enforcement efforts, particularly as it expands efforts to bring non-COCOM producers into a new export regime. Overall, present controls hamper U.S. industry more than they do the Soviets, and the United States is simply not well served by policies that restrict the export of products Moscow can buy elsewhere.

If hard currency is available, Soviet-Western trade for non-strategic computer products would expand into a wide range of areas in computer products, provision of services, and cooperation in developing software and applications could be expanded. Examples include: i) computers in education, educational software, U.S.-Russian language translation; ii) nuclear plant safety or other areas of industrial safety including the training of safety personnel and design of safety equipment; and iii) computerized data management for health and epidemiology.

The U.S. computer industry is an important asset to U.S. national security. It makes a direct contribution to defense and contributes to the efficiency of the American economy. There is danger that restricting technology transfer could hurt the development of domestic computing. The objective of export control is to delay and to raise the cost of the upgrading of Soviet military systems. However, delay is of little value without concurrent rapid progress on our side; the best way to stay ahead in a race is to run faster. The United States needs to end export control of low-technology commodity computers.
4. Rethinking Business with the USSR
Laurence W. Britt

A new and bold U.S. economic policy toward the USSR is required to exploit the real opportunities for trade and investment created by current Soviet plans for economic reform.

Existing U.S. legislation such as the Export Control Act and the Jackson-Vanik Amendment to the Trade Act of 1974 imposes a nearly impossible burden on trade relations between the United States and the Soviet Union. Much of this legislation grew out of a compelling policy rationale in the past. But its relevance to current conditions has now become questionable.

Moreover, instruments other than U.S. legislation have curbed U.S.-Soviet trade as well. The most notable such instrument is the Coordinating Committee (COCOM) on strategic trade control. Thus, in a study published in early 1987, the National Academy of Sciences concluded that drastically reducing the COCOM list of restricted products would make little if any useful military technology available to the Soviet Union, but that these restrictions cost U.S. companies as much as $9 billion in annual sales.

An American program of trade expansion with the USSR would generally benefit the U.S. economy not only because of its impact on U.S. exports but also because the related improvement in U.S-Soviet relations would eventually permit cuts in defense spending that would spur U.S. international economic competitiveness.

The scope and durability of such improvements would clearly depend on the scope and durability of Gorbachev’s success in implementing his avowed reform policies. Yet, a reversal of current trends in the Soviet Union would still leave the United States no worse off than it is today. While U.S. firms might have wasted some time and resources, there would have been a brief upswing in U.S. exports with little significance from the standpoint of military technology.

The United States should, therefore, articulate and implement a radically new U.S. economic policy toward the Soviet bloc aimed at a substantial expansion of U.S.-Soviet trade. Under this new policy, the United States would work with its partners in COCOM to reduce substantially the West’s list of embargoed goods and technologies, and more effectively control those remaining items that need to be restricted for military reasons.

The new President should also formulate policies designed to encourage American businesses to enter into joint ventures with Soviet entities and to encourage the Soviets to expand the program as well. The Department of Commerce can work with U.S. trade associations and business groups to form trade consortia that would enable small- and medium-sized businesses to sell on the Soviet market. To enable a significant increase in trade between the United States and the Soviet Union, ruble convertibility is a must. The United States should take an active role in facilitating Soviet efforts to achieve this objective.

An Agenda for the Future

Large reserves in Soviet consumer savings, due to long-standing shortages of consumer goods, and untapped Soviet potential for foreign credits provide real opportunities for trade and investments. A new and bold U.S. economic policy toward the Soviet Union is required to exploit these opportunities in the light of current Soviet plans for economic reform.

SCIENCE AND MEDICINE

5. Combined Remote-Sensing Observations of the Earth from Space
Paul Adam Blanchard

The United States and the Soviet Union should each construct, and place into polar orbit, a research satellite or space platform equipped with remote-sensing instruments and intended to carry out similar or complementary observations of the Earth, concentrating particularly on global changes in the environment.

Such observations are urgently needed. The environment for life on Earth is changing. The atmosphere, oceans, and land surfaces of the planet are undergoing significant alterations. Rising atmospheric concentrations of carbon dioxide resulting from fossil-fuel burning are creating a global warming trend. Industrially produced chlorofluorocarbons are depleting the Earth’s protective ozone layer. And tropical deforestation is altering the global biogeochemical cycles of key trace elements essential to life.

The study of such worldwide environmental changes requires systematic scientific observations from space. Only satellite observations can provide the rapid, global, and synoptic view of the environment required for an understanding of the total Earth system and the role of human activities within it.

In collaboration with other Western scientific groups, the United States has embarked upon a vigorous program of satellite Earth remote sensing intended to provide this understanding. Space missions targeted for study of specific Earth-system processes, such as the ocean-atmospheric interaction and variations in the stratospheric ozone layer, will be launched in the early 1990s. In the mid-1990s, a comprehensive Earth Observing System will be established in polar orbit to inaugurate systematic, long-duration observations of the global environment; four space platforms, contributed by the United States, Europe, and Japan, will incorporate suites of advanced instruments for a wide variety of measurements to meet requirements for both research investigations and operational weather data.

Although the Soviets maintain an active program of satellite Earth remote sensing -- which in many respects parallels U.S. efforts and demonstrates substantial
technological capabilities -- they have not cooperated, thus far, with the United States or its allies in joint studies of the Earth from space.

However, recent developments suggest that the Soviet Union is now ready to participate in international remote-sensing programs. These developments include: increasing Western access to Soviet facilities and personnel; heightened Soviet interest in international cooperation in space, particularly with the United States; and recent Soviet commitments to international Earth-study programs.

A Soviet space platform as part of the planned Earth Observing System could therefore be sought as a counterpart to one of the two platforms to be contributed by the United States. Such a contribution could take either of two forms.

First, instruments significantly different from those scheduled for the U.S. platform could be included on the Soviet platform, thereby permitting the effective use of each country's strengths. For example, the Soviets have gained extensive radar experience from the numerous radar-equipped satellites they have launched over the years and from interplanetary missions. Second, the United States could suggest that the Soviet platform be equipped with instruments that are functional duplicates of those used on the U.S. platform, making it possible to revisit important sites more frequently and to create backup systems in the event of instrument failure aboard either nation's spacecraft.

Sought with the approval of all other contributing countries, Soviet participation would substantially augment the scientific capabilities of the Earth Observing System. Such joint remote-sensing efforts would enable the West to exploit demonstrated Soviet strengths in several relevant technologies, such as radar. Soviet participation would also provide access to Soviet territory -- a vast and ecologically crucial portion of the Earth's surface. And with each superpower retaining control of the instruments on their respective satellites, the West could easily guard militarily significant technology.

6. A Radio Telescope Larger Than Earth

George Sellstad

To accept the Soviet invitation to participate in an international project -- called RADIOASTRON -- designed to launch a radio telescope into orbit around the Earth and link it electronically to radio telescopes on the ground.

During the last three decades, our understanding of the universe has advanced almost explosively. The advance was not the result of incremental evolutionary improvements to existing fields of scientific investigation; rather it resulted from such revolutionary breakthroughs as the opening of the entire electromagnetic spectrum to astronomical investigation and the beginning of space exploration.

These two parallel developments intersect in the 1990s in a project to construct a radio telescope so large -- larger, in fact, than the planet itself -- that it will reveal angular detail finer than can any other telescope operating in any wavelength regime. Such details are likely to enable astronomers to probe for the first time the immediate environs of black holes, nature's most exotic and puzzling specimens.

The first portion of the electromagnetic spectrum outside the visible to yield to technology's thrust was the radio. For some decades, interest focused on the most violent and transient phenomenon, namely, the quasars discovered by radio astronomers. These objects shattered prevailing standards of distance, age, energy content, and density. Their radiating volumes are so small, though, that the ultimate source of their prodigious energy has remained hidden to any telescope's vision -- until radio astronomers began to connect independent antennas into a single, ultra-precise telescope.

This astonishing ability to couple distinct structures into a unit through a process called interferometry has enabled the synthesis of a telescope as large as the earth, a so-called Global Array. Now, the revolutionary ability to conduct activities in space makes it possible to connect antennas well beyond earth's dimensions to antennas on the ground to give the resolution necessary to penetrate to the core of quasars.

While several proposals for putting radio antennas in space exist, only one is, at this time, funded and under development. Yet, U.S. contributions to this first international Ground-Space Telescope -- an international project called RADIOASTRON originated by the Soviet Union -- have been difficult to arrange.

A firm commitment to active U.S. participation is now needed. The required contributions, representing only a fraction of the mission's total costs, would include: first, the transfer of special recording terminals to sites in the Soviet Union; second, the fabrication of a sensitive amplifier for 1.3 centimeter wavelength to be mounted on the space antenna; third, the construction in the United States of a large ground antenna linked full-time to antennas in space; and fourth, the addition of a two-way, ground-satellite communications station without which a shortage of available ground-space communications might soon emerge.

The first two of these contributions are needed immediately since components for the RADIOASTRON spacecraft are due by the end of 1991. Decisions pertaining to the third and fourth contributions should be made shortly thereafter to permit adequate time for major construction projects.

In addition, these contributions should be made within the grander vision that Space-Ground Telescopes will evolve into arrays linking several antennas -- perhaps as many as six -- in carefully chosen space orbits with a superarray of ground antennas. The U.S. should therefore also consider the eventual contributions of two or three orbiting antennas that would be about three times larger in diameter than the original RADIOASTRON antenna, and an International Space VLBI (Very Long-Based Interferometry) Institute to coordinate all activities.
A Report to the Forty-First President

To boycott RADIOASTRON would be to forfeit U.S. scientific participation in a field that Americans have driven to its present state of excellence. U.S. radio astronomers have introduced many of the technical developments that made this next stage possible. They possess some technologies that are superior to those of other nations. Their scientific appetites demand access to the data the space antenna will provide. In sum, U.S. participation to this project would strengthen it considerably without causing technology transfers that might arouse national security concerns.

7. Joint Development of an Inherently Safe Nuclear Reactor

Jack N. Barkenbus

Joint and construction of a new generation of nuclear reactors safe enough to be accepted by the populations of the United States and the Soviet Union.

A renewed examination of nuclear power is underway due to the possible climate-warming effects associated with other (fossil-fuel based) energy sources. At the center of this reexamination are so-called inherently safe reactors; that is, reactors designed to eliminate the possibility of the most frightening of nuclear accidents -- the core melt, or melt-down -- through the incorporation of passive safety systems based on chemical and physical laws of nature.

In the past few years, nuclear engineers have made impressive progress in developing plausible designs for an inherently safe reactor, and several variants have now emerged. However, commercial vendors (especially in the United States) fear that even a successful prototype -- which would cost hundreds of millions of dollars to construct and test -- would not significantly transform public apprehensions, thereby leaving the market for nuclear power wholly uncertain.

Cost-sharing for prototype construction and testing is therefore a necessity. Collaboration would also give reactor development a viability or prominence that could not be achieved by working alone. Since U.S.-Soviet nuclear fission cooperation dates back to 1973, this initiative would simply be an expansion in collaboration rather than a novel undertaking.

A joint effort in this area need not be limited to the United States and the Soviet Union. International cooperative efforts in nuclear fusion research provide a useful model for organizing a truly international collaborative effort on inherently safe reactors. In April 1988, the United States, the Soviet Union, Japan, and the European Community agreed to proceed with an International Thermonuclear Experimental Reactor project estimated at $150 to $200 million. The same countries, plus other nuclear states such as China and India, could also contribute to an international inherently safe reactor program.

An Agenda for the Future

Before agreeing to proceed with such a project, scientists and engineers would first have to come to an agreement on the kind of reactor to be built (whether cooled by water, gas or liquid metal) and the specific safety standards they would seek. An inherently safer reactor project would also have to deal with a range of dispute resolution and technology transfer questions, as well as the loss of decision-making autonomy that each participating country would suffer. But similar issues have been dealt with successfully by governments involved in collaborative nuclear fusion research.

Inherent safety does not mean absolute safety. Nor does it necessarily translate into economic, cost-effective power. But with so few long-term energy options available, turning away from nuclear power simply because a panacea for its drawbacks does not yet exist would be mistaken. U.S.-Soviet and broader international cooperation on designing and constructing inherently safe reactors would add significantly to the range of energy choices for the benefit of future generations.

8. Cooperation in Surgical Oncology

J. Ralph Broadwater, M.D.; Michael J. Edwards, M.D.; Merrick I. Ross, M.D.; and Charles M. Bulch, M.D.

A joint effort to disseminate practical knowledge of cancer therapy, beginning with an exchange of surgical oncologists, and focusing on the exchange of clinical information, the design and integration of clinical protocols, and the exchange of current oncological research.

U.S.-Soviet medical cooperation dates back to 1956, and Soviet and American researchers have conferred on cancer-related topics since 1960. Yet, the effectiveness and increasingly sophisticated equipment of the Soviet cancer care program are not well known in the United States. Delivery of such care in the USSR is based on the dispensary principle, which combines attempts to eliminate the kinds of working and social conditions that tend to cause cancer; systematic observation of selected population groups; all forms of therapy; and rehabilitation.

In addition, Soviet doctors have had vast experience with an unusually large cancer-patient population, as well as with relatively stable population groups, a factor which allows for large-scale epidemiological studies. In short, the Soviet cancer program provides a sturdy pillar for a collaborative anticancer drive with the United States.

Surgical oncologists are a logical choice to spearhead such a drive. Their discipline requires a detailed understanding of multimodality therapy (which emphasizes a combination of treatments), and their practice allows them to manage patients with all stages of the disease. In addition, surgical oncologists must be familiar with epidemiology, statistics, clinical trial design, tumor biology, and immunology. Moreover, the integrated approach to cancer care they have developed has resulted in several important advances in patient care.
The proposal for an exchange program involving surgical oncologists would focus on encouraging the exchange of clinical information, the design and integration of clinical protocols, and the exchange of current oncological research. The program would unfold progressively in four phases, with the implementation of each phase dependent upon successful completion of the previous one.

Phase I would involve the exchange of senior surgical oncologists and aim principally at identifying specific areas of common interest. Senior oncologists from each country would visit the other for a three-week period in order to identify institutions willing to formalize working relationships with each other; outline similarities and differences in the current management of various major types of cancer; formulate suggestions for information exchange and protocol designs; examine similarities and differences in cancer care techniques; and identify epidemiological questions for clinical research.

This exchange could begin six months following the adoption of the program. Limited funding would be required, possibly from the National Cancer Institute.

Phase II would utilize the sister-institution mechanism to improve the exchange of information and education resources between the two countries. Faculty members from participating institutions would meet to discuss specific tumors, outline potential clinical investigations, and begin protocol design. These meetings would also be used to present clinical and basic research. Publication of the proceedings would improve dissemination of the latest research results at limited cost. In addition, Soviet surgical oncologists could present their newest findings at the annual meeting of the U.S. Society of Surgical Oncology.

Phase II could begin approximately one year after implementation of the program. Funding for this phase could be provided by participating sister institutions or through existing funding agencies.

Phase III would involve the exchange of physicians, and could start two years after launching the program. Junior surgical faculty would spend three months at their sister institution and participate in teaching, seminars, administration of protocols, and surgical demonstrations. Advances in surgical technology identified in the previous phases would be exchanged as well. Funding for Phase III -- chiefly for travel and expenses -- would be sought from the National Cancer Institute.

Successful completion of the first three phases would allow the program to expand into other disciplines of oncology -- radiation therapy, medical oncology, and basic cancer research. In Phase IV, physicians and scientists from these fields would be recruited and their participation centered around the previously established sister institutions. Again, funding would be sought from the National Cancer Institute, but specific projects would compete for funding through the standard grant mechanism. This phase could be implemented roughly three to four years after the beginning of Phase I.
Each Center's professional staff would consist of about thirty-five Soviet teachers in the United States, and a like number of American teachers in the USSR, for one academic year: fifteen elementary teachers, and ten each at the junior and senior high school levels. A group of six educational administrators and three specialists would also be exchanged for each Center, where they would be joined by a comparable number of personnel from the host country.

Both in the United States and in the Soviet Union, a support network would be developed to assure that qualified teachers are identified and briefed, that research issues are appropriately framed and addressed, and that results are widely disseminated. In the United States, these networks could be modeled on or affiliated with the Coalition of Essential Schools, the National Network for Educational Renewal, the main teachers unions, and such other organizations as Phi Delta Kappa. In the Soviet Union, the Academy of Pedagogical Sciences, the teachers union, and the new Creative Union of Teachers could serve in this capacity.

Joint research and development programs dealing with a broad range of topics would be conducted in each Center. Some programs would proceed on parallel tracks in both countries; others would be carried out in one location only. In all cases, the focus would be on integrating theory and practice, on the applicability of results to real teaching situations, and on the collaborative investigation of problems.

The results of the Centers' work would be disseminated through local and regional workshops and conferences, presentations at professional meetings, and appropriate publications. Instructional materials based on the Centers' activities would be developed and published, and profits from the sale of these materials used for the operation of the Centers.

The educational reform project will be valuable for giving educators in the United States and the USSR experience in working jointly on a topic of mutual concern; it will also provide an opportunity to gain specific new ideas on upgrading schools. The project could be declared a success if those involved developed new perspectives on altering the organizations of their schools, arriving jointly at new approaches to teaching, and changing the nature of education as a social institution.

10. An American College in Moscow

Karen A. Weisblat

An American College in Moscow, preceded by a smaller-scale American Center for International Relations and Business Management, would represent the newest of a long line of prestigious institutions abroad.

Before its opening by the turn of the century, a four-year, liberal arts American College in Moscow would be preceded by a smaller-scale American Center for International Relations and Business Management. Such a Center would be loosely modeled after both the Bologna (Italy) Center of the School of Advanced International Studies of the Johns Hopkins University and the Johns Hopkins University-Nanjing University Center for Chinese and American Studies in the People's Republic of China.

The American Center in Moscow would offer a one-year interdisciplinary program of studies in International Economics and Politics, Business Management, and History to approximately 100 qualified undergraduate and graduate students from a variety of fields, universities, and countries. English would be the primary language of instruction, and a diploma (as well as relevant academic credit hours) would be awarded upon satisfactory completion of the program.

The Center faculty would be recruited from universities in the United States, the Soviet Union and other countries. Members of the business and diplomatic communities in Moscow would also be called upon to enrich the program with guest lectures and presentations. The Center would be administered by resident coordinators appointed by the host institutions.

After a period of five years the Center would be reviewed and a decision made with regard to the transition to a full College whose establishment would preserve the identity of the original Center as a graduate institution.

The College proper would be fully accredited and registered in the United States and around the world, and it would grant the degrees of bachelor of Arts or Bachelor of Science. A full curriculum of courses would offer majors in such subjects as Arts History, Russian Literature, Soviet Area Studies, English, American Area Studies, European Studies, Communications, Religion, Philosophy, History, Government, International Affairs, Comparative Literature, Computer Science, and International Economics. Upperclassmen with appropriate language skills would be permitted to take some courses in neighboring Soviet institutions.

The international faculty would enjoy traditional American academic freedoms, including responsibility for appointments and academic standards. Admission to the coeducational college would be based on several factors, including high school performance, standardized test scores, personal references, and a personal interview. Every effort would be made to create a student body where all nationalities, races, and religions are represented. Soviet students would be chosen in the same way as their American counterparts, but, like all other non-English speaking students, they would be required to pass the test of English as a foreign language.

Funding for the American College in Moscow would come from corporate, foundation, and individual donors in both countries. Admittedly, the project would be costly to develop and to run. The College would be cosponsored by a Soviet University, one of the Soviet institutes of international relations or American studies, or a state ministry. The College itself would be administered by a bipartisan American board of directors composed of prominent citizens knowledgeable about international relations and a similar body should oversee the creation of the college.
A Report to the Forty-First President

Although the College would be a self-contained unit, outreach programs organized to serve the needs of the local and foreign communities would provide useful cultural and intellectual links with the city and the country.

11. Cooperation to Protect the Environment and Conserve Resources

David McClave

To pool the scientific and technological expertise of the United States and the Soviet Union to stave off a series of threatening environmental crises.

In the United States, new warnings about the depletion of the Earth’s ozone layer and the accelerating disappearance of tropical rain forests, the scouring summer of 1988, and water pollution bad enough to close major bathing beaches in the northeastern part of the country have served as dramatic reminders of growing environmental problems. Similarly, in the Soviet Union, the 1986 nuclear accident at Chernobyl, the near-destruction of the Aral Sea, and the be fouling of Lake Baikal have belied the standard ideological myth that pollution is a byproduct of capitalism only and caused astonishingly uninhibited discussions and debates among Soviet officials and scientists.

In contrast to most governmental agencies in the two countries, the agendas of both the Environmental Protection Agency and the new State Committee for the Protection of Nature largely coincide. Citizen-capitalists and citizen-socialists alike prefer clean water and air over polluted water and air; given the choice they would elect to preserve the sable, the sturgeon, the timber wolf or the bald eagle rather than preside over their extinction.

In line with a general agreement on cooperation in environmental protection, and building upon the foundations provided by several joint ventures already under way (for example, working groups on climate and ozone protection, and joint research expeditions to such places as the Bering Sea), specific cooperative endeavors should be initiated between the two countries’ agencies responsible for environment protection and conservation of resources.

Some of these endeavors could be administered by jointly staffed environmental protection offices in the capitals of the two countries. Related activities would include taking the ecological “vital signs” of each country at various bases — monitoring, for example, ambient air quality in industrial centers. Problems associated with water use and pollution in the arid regions of both countries are serious enough, especially in the Soviet case, to warrant special attention and emergency corrective measures.

The U.S.-Canadian Waterton Glacier International Peace Park could be used as a fifty-year-old precedent and model for the creation of a U.S.-Soviet Nature Preserve, a potential World Natural Heritage Site spanning the Bering Strait and encompassing parts of Alaska and the Chukchi Peninsula. This project would be an ecological workshop emphasizing wilderness and wildlife preservation.

Additional projects could also be launched to further cooperation in other spheres. Thus, monitoring airborne pollutants and ozone layer damage involves space research and activities, an area in which both countries excel. Resolving the problem of safe disposal of nuclear waste would draw upon decades of experience each country has had in the peaceful uses of the atom.

A gradual shift toward policies and programs based on deep respect for and appreciation of both national and global ecosystems could be brought about through such collaborative Soviet-American efforts in environmental protection and conservation of resources.

12. A Bilateral Endowment for the Arts and Humanities

John Logan Barrow and Patricia O’Leary

To promote a qualitatively new form of exchange program through which creative artists and humanities specialists from one country can live, travel, and work for extended periods of time in the other country.

Cultural exchanges between the United States and the Soviet Union remain far too modest, especially given the cultural achievements and heritage of both societies. Moreover, current exchanges concentrate almost exclusively on displays and performances, and limit the possible impact of cross-cultural fertilization by restricting the scope of artistic and creative interaction. A new Bilateral Endowment for the Arts and Humanities would be designed both to broaden and deepen the present tentative cultural dialogue.

First, the Endowment would pursue those aspects of the 1988 U.S.-Soviet cultural agreement that still require further negotiation — including the details of activities and exhibits already approved, as well as arrangements for more permanent programs such as cultural information centers.

Second, the Endowment would promote exchanges not covered by currently agreed quotas for scholars and scientists, and it would also facilitate exchange programs in the arts and humanities between private U.S. organizations and their Soviet counterparts (universities for example). In addition, the Endowment would enable individuals not affiliated with established groups to apply for the funding needed to participate in exchange programs.

Third, the Endowment would help fulfill the government’s pledge that cultural exchange programs will not be sustained with taxpayer dollars. Over a period of time, the Endowment would be expected to become self-sufficient — even though it would still rely for its services and locations on other institutions. For instance, royalties from the
proceeds of exchanges and sales of art could be used by the Endowment as a source of funding.

The Endowment would be designed to give artists and humanities specialists a chance to immerse themselves in representative aspects of a foreign culture for much longer periods than most exchange programs currently permit. The variety of exchanges would be limited only by the imagination.

For example, publicizing design competitions in both countries through the Endowment would make it possible for architects and city planners to contribute their own distinctive national perspectives to a variety of specific projects; Soviet planners could teach their American counterparts about concepts that reflect ethnic and architectural diversity; in turn, the Soviets could benefit from exposure to U.S. concepts that emphasize cultural, environmental, and economic requirements.

In music, the Endowment could help Soviet composers explore opportunities in the American commercial music industry, while American musicians could compose scores for Soviet films. Where existing exchange programs for philosophers and theologians stress specific research projects of short duration, the Endowment would give these scholars the possibility to study and teach in the other society for more than a semester or two. And, finally, the Endowment would provide new exchange opportunities in non-traditional fields as well -- in the area of design, for instance, where the marketing skills of American designers and the Soviet predilection for durability could be seen as complimentary.

At the outset, a broad agreement on major philosophical and operational questions would be sought among U.S. officials responsible for cultural exchanges, representatives of foundations and endowments, and distinguished members of the American arts community before any plan could be presented to the Soviets. As part of this agreement, the Endowment would be appointed to enlist the interest of possible individual or institution sponsors; to seek the support of elected officials; and to examine the most effective institutional form the Endowment would ultimately take.

The Endowment would be governed by a Board representing both countries and appointed by their respective governments. Board members would serve staggered terms and meet at least twice a year. Day-to-day operations would be handled by a modest staff, with annual costs ranging from $100,000 upward, depending on the scope and range of services offered. At one end of the cost spectrum, the Endowment would be a paper organization with mainly communicative functions -- to recruit talent and borrow facilities for its activities from other institutions. At the other end, offices could be set up in both countries, with a staff to provide participants with such varied services as travel assistance, updates on changed legal conditions, and helpful official contacts.

Periodic staff reports would help monitor the work of the Endowment. In each of its national settings, the staff would publicize the Endowment's activities, solicit grant proposals, and acquaint visiting artists with projects held in the host country. Finally, the Endowment would also launch and pursue a dialogue on the impact of the U.S.-Soviet relationship on the human condition, about which it would report periodically and publicly.

DEFENSE AND ARMS CONTROL

13. Converting Nuclear Missiles for Peaceful Use
William C. Potter and Ann M. Fiorini

To permit, in the context of a bilateral arms control agreement, the conversion of U.S. and Soviet decommissioned ballistic missiles into space launchers for peaceful purposes.

A prospective agreement on deep cuts in strategic weapons will confront the United States and the Soviet Union with the task of eliminating large numbers of ballistic missiles. Rather than dismantling and destroying them, the two countries should negotiate a START accord that permits each of them to convert their decommissioned ballistic missiles into space launchers for peaceful purposes.

The technical feasibility of using retired missiles as boosters for spacecraft has already been demonstrated by both the United States and the Soviet Union. Past conversions, however, have never been done in the context of a bilateral arms control agreement. Whereas most INF missiles would have lacked the thrust required to be cost-effective boosters, the larger missiles currently under review in the START negotiations could place a variety of payloads into orbit.

The cost of using converted missiles varies greatly depending upon the missiles, launch facilities, and payloads under consideration. However, prior conversion experience and present commercial interest suggest that economic savings for certain kinds of space launch activities may be substantial. Indeed, U.S. private firms have already expressed interest in using some of the ballistic missiles likely to be covered in a START accord for commercial space launch purposes, including the MX and the Poseidon C-3. On the Soviet side, the SS-18 and SS-19 would appear to be attractive candidates for conversion given their relatively large size and payload capacity.

Converted missiles would contribute to the growing U.S.-Soviet cooperation in space. Useful missions that could take advantage of the launchers include the study of space weather, a probe to the sun, and study of global environmental problems such as the depletion of stratospheric ozone and the 'greenhouse effect.' In addition, converted missiles could also provide launch services for developing countries, where the potential of telecommunications and remote-sensing satellites for use in agriculture, industry, education, health and social services in the Third World has long been recognized. Most developing states, however, simply cannot afford to build, launch,
A Report to the Forty-First President

and operate satellites, and do not have the ground facilities to take advantage of the satellite data already available. An international effort led by the United States and the Soviet Union could exploit decommissioned ballistic missiles to assist developing countries that need to acquire satellite services. In so doing, a missile conversion program would demonstrate the tangible benefits that arms control can bring to Third World nations. This demonstration could be especially important in gaining support for renewal of the Non-Proliferation Treaty at the 1995 Review Conference.

A missile conversion program would require verification safeguards whose intrusiveness would depend on the number and kinds of systems to be modified, the pace of conversion and the time period for launch of converted missiles, the extent of international cooperation envisaged in the space launch program, and the specifics of the strategic arms control accord which affords the opportunity for conversion. Although verification measures would entail a combination of national technical means and on-site inspection, neither the verification requirements nor the costs of verifying conversion would be substantially more than would be necessary under a START treaty without a conversion clause.

The United States and the Soviet Union are now in a unique position to reduce the risk of nuclear war by eliminating large numbers of ballistic missiles and simultaneously spur international cooperation in space. If they seize the opportunity, they could demonstrate a space-age version of meeting "swords into ploughshares."

14. Strategic Information Exchanges as Confidence-Building Measures

Paul Chrenowski, William Dunlop, Peter Moulthrop, and George Staehle

To organize regularly scheduled information exchanges between the United States and the Soviet Union on strategic nuclear weapon systems in the areas of safety, future capability, and current effectiveness.

With the Soviet Union moving away from past practices of releasing no information at all on its nuclear forces, and recently approving a program to share information on some issues of technical interest, prospects for the exchange of some categories of data are improving. The information would not only be useful in assessing the accuracy of expectations about苏联 nuclear forces, it would also provide useful data on the effect of deployment on the availability of data to the public.

Safety-related exchanges could cover methods to prevent unauthorized use, inadvertent launch, accidental detonation, or accidental dispersal of radioactive particles. While most of this information is currently classified in the United States, past experience has shown a Soviet interest in receiving official confirmation of what is otherwise available in the public domain.

These exchanges would include both descriptions and some demonstrations and would focus on three subjects: preventing accidents -- by the use of safety and security devices and by the use of insensitive high explosive; minimizing the consequences of accidents--through emphasis on technical approaches to improved safety; and attending to the consequences of various accident scenarios -- which would entail an examination by Soviet and American experts of the potential for plutonium contamination and the criteria for cleanup.

Exchanges on deployment plans for strategic weapons would take place according to a regular schedule -- perhaps annually. Initial notification about new systems would be made from eight to ten years in advance of deployment. Notification would not imply a commitment to deploy by a specific date, or even to deploy at all. But an agreement to exchange deployment plans would be explicitly understood as a solemn commitment not to deploy any system that has not been included in the information exchange.

Information to be shared would include data on numbers to be deployed, yields, and basing schemes. This information would be particularly important if a strategic arms reduction agreement leaves both countries with many fewer strategic weapons because the consequences of treaty breakout may be more dangerous with smaller arsenals.

Deployment-related information exchanges could be a logical extension of the data exchanges on current forces that are included in the INF treaty and are part of the START talks. They would also be in some ways a natural extension of the recent and unprecedented exchange visits of senior U.S. and Soviet defense officials. Strategic information exchanges on deployment plans are seen mainly as a confidence-building measure, but could also contribute to strategic stability by helping to prevent the kind of misunderstanding that developed over the Soviet development of SS-19 intercontinental ballistic missiles after the 1972 SALT I agreement.

Finally, the two countries could exchange information on the yields of weapons currently deployed on ICBMs, submarine-launched ballistic missiles, strategic cruise missiles, and strategic bombers. The exchanges would also increase measures to corroborate the accuracy of the yield values. Yield information on U.S. systems has appeared in the open literature, but Soviet secrecy prevents the United States from having high confidence in its estimates of Soviet yields.

To strengthen its reliability, the exchange of yield values could be accompanied by an exchange of the dates of any nuclear tests on which the expected yield value (as known at the time of deployment) is based, and by an exchange of the yield of that test; differences between the two would have to be explained. More intrusive checks of the yield values could be considered as well -- perhaps by exploiting the opportunities for on-site inspection that may be included in a START treaty.

Strategic information exchanges would help make nuclear weapons safer, reduce uncertainties about future deployments, and cultivate the kind of openness required for further improvements in U.S.-Soviet relations.
15. Military Liaisons between NATO and the Warsaw Pact

John A. Fahey and Philip S. Gillette

To exchange military liaison missions between the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and the Warsaw Pact that would provide for continuous and direct on-site liaison and communications at the highest operational military level.

In 1987 and 1988, the scope of the bilateral U.S.-Soviet military dialogue expanded dramatically, with an unprecedented series of high-level visits and agreements for further exchanges and the establishment of a joint working group to explore the issue of dangerous military activity.

An exchange of military liaison missions between NATO and the Warsaw Pact would help advance and expand such a dialogue. Located at or near the military headquarters of the Warsaw Pact (Moscow) and NATO (Mont, Belgium) these missions would aim at providing continuous and direct on-site liaison and communication at the highest operational military level in Europe.

Currently, the most visible lines of communications between the two alliances are the official communiqués they both issue routinely. Since 1975, NATO and the Warsaw Pact have also been engaged in the Mutual and Balanced Force Reduction Talks (MBFR) in Vienna, Austria. The Helsinki process includes a review conference every three years, as well as two specialized forums on security issues: the Conference on Confidence and Security Building Measures and Disarmament in Europe (CCEE) and the Conventional Stability Talks (CST), expected to begin in 1989. Both the MBFR and Helsinki Forums are directed by political and diplomatic personnel, not military officers.

The existing links between the two alliances in Europe are sparse, especially at the purely military level. In contrast, on-site military liaison has been functioning in Germany since 1947, when the Hubein-Malinin Agreement established Military Liaison Missions accredited to the Soviet and American commanders-in-chief of their respective zones of occupation. (The British and French have maintained military liaison missions under parallel agreements.) The apparent success of these missions suggests that bloc-to-bloc military liaison missions would also be worthwhile.

Military Liaison Missions between NATO and the Warsaw Pact would be designed to promote common interests and mutual understanding, to provide direct on-site liaison and communications at the highest operational military level in Europe, and to serve as on-site instruments for a myriad of liaison functions. They would be strictly military missions -- with no authority over political or diplomatic missions, and their staffs would contain no political representatives.

The staff members of each mission -- limited to twenty-five officers and enlisted personnel -- would receive diplomatic immunity, and each mission would have full rights of extra-territoriality. Staff members would enjoy identical travel rights, and requests to visit military facilities would be honored on a reciprocal basis, under the supervision of the host command.

Finally, these missions would be especially well-suited to handle incidents arising between the two alliances that now fall outside existing military channels of communication. In particular, they could help defuse incidents involving the armed forces of countries not participating in Hubein-Malinin-type missions (for instance, West Germany), or handle problems occurring outside the geographic area covered by these agreements (Czechoslovakia, for example).

The establishment of bloc-to-bloc military missions would respond to an apparent interest of Soviet and Warsaw Pact leaders in promoting greater contacts between the two alliances. They would also help devise an Alliance-wide liaison arrangement with the Warsaw Pact that would be preferable to a proliferation of bilateral military dialogues and/or missions between members of the two alliances, which might otherwise be the result of Soviet initiatives.

In sum, the organization of alliance-to-alliance military missions would apply forty years of experience with bilateral liaison missions in East and West Germany to cover the entire range of East-West military issues in Europe. This plan would significantly expand East-West cooperation without requiring fundamental changes in the U.S.-Soviet relationship. But it would provide a foundation for such changes if and when the necessary international political conditions emerge.

16. A $100 Billion Understanding

Barry M. Blechman, with Ethan Gutmann

To devise with the Soviets a menu of arms control agreements designed to achieve sizeable cuts -- as much as $100 billion -- in defense expenditures without altering the respective roles in the world of the United States and the Soviet Union.

Arms control agreements must not be negotiated primarily for economic reasons. Far more basic considerations of national security and international political relationships hinge on these agreements, and should always dominate decisionmaking. Still, could the prospect of significant economic benefits help shape and realize a significant restructuring of the U.S.-Soviet relationship and resulting progress in arms negotiations? Could the United States bring to the table a tacit long-term objective of negotiating arrangements necessary to cut defense expenditures by one third -- "a $100 billion understanding" with the Soviet Union whose related savings would be comparable-- without altering the American role in the world?

Reaching such a goal is obviously a tall order. There is nothing certain about the cost implications or arms control agreements. Quite apart from the uncertainties of cost data, deciding what to include among the fiscal implications of an agreement and what to exclude is a matter of taste, judgment, and perspective. What can be most generally said is that budgetary savings from arms agreements concluded to date have been modest, to
A Report to the Forty-First President

say the least; and some previous agreements, in fact, may have led to even greater defense expenditures.

Let us assume, nevertheless, a negotiating agenda that would include four kinds of agreements: a treaty to make "deep cuts" in central strategic forces, like the one now being negotiated in the Strategic Arms Reduction Talks (START) together with a reaffirmation of the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) treaty's prohibition on deployments of missile defenses; an agreement to reduce by half U.S. and Soviet ground and tactical air forces in Europe; an agreement to reduce by 20 percent the size of the two countries' forces in the Pacific; and an agreement to reduce the two great powers' ground and air forces in Northeast Asia.

Admittedly, such an arms control agenda would be extraordinarily ambitious. The agreements on strategic weapons might be close at hand, but the likelihood of a European agreement on that scale within the next few years is remote. And the naval and Asian agreements have never been seriously contemplated by either government and are very unlikely to become part of the official agenda.

Even so, the total potential savings that would result from these agreements would range between an estimated $66 billion and $30 billion, depending on the assumptions used, and fall short of the $100 billion sought initially.

Yet, these results are not insignificant. Continuing progress in U.S.-Soviet negotiations make possible the avoidance of increased defense expenditures that would or might have taken place in the absence of an agreement and can never be known with certainty. A 10 to 10 percent cut in the defense budget would not solve the U.S. fiscal problem, but it would make a sizable dent. And, obviously enough, it is better to cut forces as a matter of choice, in exchange for corresponding Soviet reductions, than to do so reflexively, in response to the automatic cut provision of deficit reduction legislation.

FOREIGN POLICY

17. A Soviet-American Peace Corps

Alan Robock

A joint Soviet-American Peace Corps would increase U.S.-Soviet understanding and serve as a model for a cooperative approach toward the resolution of some fundamental problems of development in Third World countries.

An Agenda for the Future

The U.S. Peace Corps currently has 6,500 volunteers serving in 65 countries overseas. Similar volunteer organizations from 15 other developed countries have an additional 7,000 volunteers serving in the Third World. U.S. Peace Corps volunteers cooperate with their counterparts from other countries, but all the coordination takes place in the field as the Peace Corps has no bilateral agreements with other volunteer organizations.

Although the Soviet Union has no Peace Corps-type organization, its growing interest in cooperative ventures in Third World countries is reflected in the activities of the Soviet Peace Fund and the newly created International Foundation for the Survival and Development of Humanity.

In fact, the U.S. Peace Corps is already committed to one small development project involving the Soviets (in Costa Rica) and is considering another joint medical effort in Kenya. The "Partners-in-Development" project -- sponsored by Seattle-based Ploughshares and the Soviet Peace Fund -- is planning joint teams of ten American and ten Soviet volunteers to work on projects in the United States first, and in the Soviet Union next, before moving on to a model project in a developing nation on problems related to child health.

Designed to parallel the goals of the U.S. Peace Corps, a Soviet-American Peace Corps could be started most easily by building on a project already administered by the U.S. Peace Corps. Section 301 of the Peace Corps Act allows its director to spend up to 2 percent of the annual Peace Corps budget on such joint efforts, with no need for separate authority or appropriations from Congress. Candidates for limited demonstration projects with the Soviet Union as a first step toward a joint Peace Corps would include El Salvador and Vietnam.

The American-Soviet Peace Corps would work best if the U.S. Peace Corps and a parallel Soviet organization -- yet to be launched -- each formed different halves of a single joint Peace Corps. The new organization would be headed by one American and one Soviet co-director. Just as in the U.S. Peace Corps, volunteers would work together on two-year assignments in developing countries. Some American administrators would work in the joint Peace Corps office in Moscow, and some Soviet administrators would be assigned to Washington. Peace Corps training would take place in the host countries, as is the current practice, with American and Soviet volunteers studying local languages and culture. All joint projects would be started at the invitation of the host government and would operate under the direct supervision of a host-country national.

Legislation would be required to authorize and fund the joint organization. Funding would be shared equally between the two countries and could be expected to entail minimal additional expenditures on the side of the United States. The practice of giving volunteers a subsistence allowance to permit them to live at the same levels as their host country counterparts would continue, and American and Soviet volunteers would receive equal pay and free medical care, as well as a readjustment allowance or other benefits upon their return to their home countries.
The program could be inaugurated formally in 1992, a landmark year celebrating the 500th anniversary of Columbus' voyage to America and the 75th anniversary of the Bolshevik Revolution. By that time, the Soviet-American Peace Corps could be operating at full strength, with 10,000 American and 10,000 Soviet volunteers engaged in joint projects around the world. In subsequent years, it could be expanded to volunteers from other countries as the idea of national and planetary service becomes a norm.

18. U.S.-Soviet Cooperation on Terrorism

John Marks

Cooperation against terrorism should be sought in addition to, and not instead of, existing counterterrorism efforts by either superpower. Once implemented, such cooperation would provide an additional layer of protection against terrorism.

Cooperation between the United States and the Soviet Union against terrorism would promote the interests of both countries in three principal ways. First, joint action might well deter or prevent specific acts of terrorism. Second, it would help transform the global climate in which terrorists operate by signaling that despite their differences the two countries stand united in their opposition to such acts. And third, it would represent an important confidence-building measure demonstrating how the two global powers can work together even in extremely sensitive areas.

Obstacles to such cooperation must not be overlooked. The two superpowers often support organizations that the other charges with committing terrorist acts. Neither country is likely to abandon these groups in the immediate future; nor are most of the groups likely to change their tactics anytime soon. Accordingly, the superpowers are most likely to initiate cooperation not to counter specific groups but to prevent specific acts and the use of specific types of weapons.

Acts so abhorrent that they can never be justified might include: killing children, the aged, and the infirm; keeping such individuals hostage; hijacking or bombing airplanes; physical torture or kidnapping; attacking schools, hospitals, places of worship, and other humanitarian and religious sites; and attacking diplomats and international civil servants. Washington and Moscow should agree to treat such acts as crimes -- never as political acts -- whenever they occur, and no matter who carries them out.

Opposition to these acts should be demonstrated in many ways. The two countries should condemn the perpetrators consistently and publicly. They should work together to strengthen existing international agreements that protect civil aviation, require prosecution and/or extradition of terrorists, and forbid hostage-taking. They should organize a bilateral working group of legal experts whose task would be to examine and expand these agreements.

Potentially the most valuable -- but also the most sensitive -- area of anti-terrorism efforts would be the sharing of information. Yet counterterrorism services in both countries are extremely reluctant to make available such information. To overcome this reluctance every effort should be made to allay fears of damaging intelligence and technology leaks and to ensure that exchanges are mutually advantageous.

The process of sharing intelligence in a regulated, limited way could begin with meetings of high-level U.S. and Soviet counter-terrorism specialists and lead to the formation of a counterterrorism channel between the two countries -- used, for example, when either country had information about a particularly alarming act of terrorism. In addition, exchanges of information should begin with items deemed relatively non-threatening. These might include joint academic studies, exchanges on embassy defense measures, airport security, methods of handling terrorist incidents, development of joint data bases, or weapons detection with an emphasis on such emerging problems as the use of plastic handguns.

Finally, a joint U.S.-Soviet drive against terrorism should also focus on the terrorists' use of especially dangerous weapons technologies. The use of chemical, biological, and nuclear terrorism merits special attention. Unofficial U.S. and Soviet groups could provide both a testing ground and a sounding board for discussing these issues. Once the channels of communication and cooperation are established, action could follow.

The fact of U.S.-Soviet cooperation against terrorism would probably have as much impact as the specifics of the cooperation. The dangers of damaging intelligence leaks are well within the capacity of each country to minimize. And the advantages of cooperation in this area are sufficiently compelling to seek them actively.

19. Promoting Public Diplomacy through Direct Satellite Broadcasting

Thomas F. Rogers

To create a global, satellite, audio broadcasting system that can provide service on a common-carrier, common-user basis, thereby giving the United States, the Soviet Union and other countries around the world equitable access to high quality service at much lower unit costs.

Short-wave broadcasting has been the medium of choice for the transmission of news across borders. Yet, short-wave technology is now increasingly inadequate to each country's needs: broadcasting schedules are unreliable, signal quality is often poor, the world's airwaves face overcrowding, and listeners find it difficult to keep tuned to the broadcasters' changing frequencies. These shortcomings can be overcome by using...
powerful and sophisticated ultra high frequency (UHF) transmitters placed in geostationary orbit.

Recent or imminent satellite communications advances—especially by America's government-industry Advanced Communications Technology Satellite (ACTS) program—have become such that space-based audio broadcasting transmitters could begin to replace all surface-based audio shortwave transmitters well before the end of the century. They could enable governments to dispense with costly and politically vulnerable overseas repeater transmitters, and beam their programs more selectively and at a much lower unit cost. Best of all, their signals could be received by radios as inexpensive and easy to operate as today's over-the-air local broadcast sets.

The key element of the space-based segments of the Direct Broadcast from Satellite-Audio (DBS-A) would be an array of transmitters, each coupled to one or more large antennas capable of radiating a large number of narrow, shaped beams toward Earth. The selection of beams, the allocation of program channels, and the setting of radio frequency power levels for each beam would be accomplished by means of dynamic electronic switching in the satellites, all under control of the space segment's surface feeder station. The switching would respond to the broadcaster's changing needs for serving specific audiences (and therefore surface areas), and compensate for the vagaries of radio wave propagation related to the surface areas being served by each of the beams. Each space segment would be designed to operate as part of a regional system, and would be connected with others via optical or millimeter wavelength in-space links.

Acquisition costs of the space segments of the global DBS-A system are estimated at about $500 million, plus $200 million for space segment search and development. The audio channel lease prices would be apportioned to each of the broadcasting governments to reflect that fraction of the services' capability used by each of them. (The shortwave broadcasting governments now spend about $1 billion a year to retain, operate, and maintain their shortwave broadcasting plant.)

The DBS-A service would involve mixing publicly (or perhaps privately) owned space components with privately owned satellite segments; sorting out responsibilities for technology development, manufacture, distribution, and operations between the public and private sectors; and meshing these domestic and international interests of other countries. To deal with these complex issues, the President and the Congress should establish a central federal DBS-A office to oversee and coordinate all DBS-A activities.

An initial U.S.-Soviet DBS-A agreement would permit each country to use existing commercial satellite communications relay channels and their own television broadcasting networks to provide audio programs that would supplement their present shortwave audio broadcasting services quickly and at limited cost.

For instance, a daily thirty-minute Voice of America program could be relayed to Moscow in "standard" fashion using an Intelset microwave channel or a similar channel operated by Intersputnik and a single, modest microwave receiver. From Moscow, the VOA audio channel could be circulated to all of the local over-the-air television stations in the Soviet Union for local broadcast at the hour when Soviet television broadcasting comes to a close. A similar arrangement for broadcasting Radio Moscow programs in the United States could be devised using the Public Broadcasting System's local over-the-air television sound channel, or National Public Radio's sound channels, or both. The relatively modest cost of such programming could be met by federal appropriations, and/or (preferably) foundation or corporate contributions.

An early step toward creating a worldwide DBS-A service could be made by the VOA using in-orbit commercial communications satellites to broadcast audio programs to relatively sophisticated microwave receivers located near existing local over-the-air AM and FM broadcasting stations and cable systems. These signals could be made available to local broadcasters and cable system operators by the international broadcasters for real-time or delayed transmission to local audiences. The USIA's growing foreign Worldnet television reception assets could help begin a demonstration program.

The creation of an international DBS-A service would be a particularly effective use of space for the benefit of all mankind. And, especially for the two superpowers, the cooperative use of space to improve international public communications should rank at least as high as undertaking a cooperative program to travel to Mars.

20. An Advisory Council on American-Soviet Relations

Jack Perry

To create a national Advisory Council on American-Soviet Relations to help achieve continuity in the formulation and implementation of U.S. policy toward the Soviet Union.

The lack of a continuing central ground for policy formulation in the United States makes it difficult to fashion a steady, workable, coherent, and sellable American policy toward the Soviet Union. The creation of a national Advisory Council on American-Soviet Relations would aim at improving such a situation.

Appointment to the Advisory Council would be made by the President with the consent of the Senate. Members would include academics, businessmen with experience in East-West commerce, military leaders, arms control specialists, scientists, retired diplomats, and representatives of cultural groups, church bodies, peace organizations, and Soviet emigres.

Like other governmental advisory bodies, the American-Soviet Council would be headquartered in Washington, D.C., although it could meet in various locations. A small professional staff would prepare its meetings and issue its reports. Just as the U.S. Advisory Commission on Public Diplomacy oversees the operations of the U.S. Information Agency, the Council would oversee, in a very general way, the activities of government agencies responsible for the various parts of America's Soviet policy. Although the panel
would not serve as a watchdog over clandestine operations affecting the USSR, it would consider how the overall functioning of the intelligence community fits into the planning of U.S. Soviet policy.

To make a difference, the Council would not be limited to oversight. It would also have a broad mandate to assess the state of U.S.-Soviet relations at any given time, and to make judgments about the policies flowing from such assessment. Its private reports to the President and other senior officials would lay out alternatives and provide new Presidents in particular with at least some basis for grounding policy in Soviet realities as well as domestic political considerations. In public reports, the Council could explain the state of U.S.-Soviet relations in a nonpartisan way that would downplay mood swings and emphasize enduring interests irrespective of momentary tides in politics or sentiment.

To be effective, the Council would have to overcome the skepticism traditionally shown toward such advisory bodies — whether from Congress or the bureaucracy. Yet, as a nonpartisan and nongovernmental entity comprising a limited number of distinguished Americans of recognized stature, the Council's assessments would enjoy considerable credibility.

In addition, the Council could help merge the disparate elements of U.S. policy toward the Soviet Union into a genuine strategy incorporating diplomacy, economics, and military power. One of the Council's most valuable contributions would be to examine the country's strategic needs, and place defense planning and the defense budget squarely within that context.

Finally, the Advisory Council would give the executive branch support for addressing an unruly Congress. By setting forth facts, and outlining what is in the national interest, the Council would give civil servants a standard that could not be easily ignored, and, on this most vital issue, help pull together the vast U.S. government.

Creation of the Council would not be a panacea. But it would help move the United States in a direction that applies the strength and understanding of the American people to the prime foreign policy challenge facing the nation.

PART III

CONTRIBUTORS

THE FUTURE OF U.S.-SOVIET RELATIONS

Richard J. Barnet is senior fellow at the Institute for Policy Studies.

Seweryn Bialer is professor of political science and director of the Institute on International Change at Columbia University, New York.

Coit D. Blacker is associate professor of international relations at the School of International Relations of the University of Southern California, Los Angeles.

Barry M. Blechman is fellow at the Johns Hopkins Foreign Policy Institute.

Stephen F. Cohen is professor of politics and director of the Russian Studies Program at Princeton University, Princeton, New Jersey.

William E. Colby is counsel at Donovan, Leisure, Newton and Irvine.

Arthur Macy Cox is secretary of the American Committee on U.S.-Soviet Relations.

Randall Forsberg is executive director of the Institute for Defense and Disarmament Studies, Brookline, Massachusetts.

Alton Frye is Washington director and senior fellow of the Council on Foreign Relations.

Raymond L. Garthoff is senior fellow at The Brookings Institution.

Archibald L. Gillies is president of the World Policy Institute, New York.

Marshall I. Goldman is associate director of the Russian Research Center at Harvard University, and the Class of 1919 Professor of Economics at Wellesley College.

Roger D. Hansen is professor and director of international relations at the School of Advanced International Studies.

Frank Von Hippel is professor of public and international affairs at Princeton University.

Arnold Horelick is director of the RAND/UCLA Center for the Study of Soviet International Behavior, senior corporate fellow in Soviet affairs at RAND, and professor of political science at the University of California at Los Angeles.
Robert E. Hunter is senior fellow in Middle Eastern studies at the Center for Strategic and International Studies.

Spurgeon M. Keeny, Jr., is president and executive director of the Arms Control Association.

Catherine M. Kelleher is director of the Center for International Security Studies at the University of Maryland, College Park.

Geoffrey Kemp is senior associate at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.

William H. Kincade is adjunct professor of national security studies at Georgetown University.

Robert Legvold is director of the W. Averell Harriman Institute for Advanced Study of the Soviet Union and professor of political science at Columbia University.

Robert J. Lieber is professor of government at Georgetown University.

George Liska is professor of political science at the Johns Hopkins University and professor of international relations at the School of Advanced International Studies.

Michael Mandelbaum is senior fellow and director of the Project on East-West Relations of the Council on Foreign Relations.

Janne E. Nolan is visiting fellow at The Brookings Institution.

Joseph S. Nye, Jr., is director of the Center for Science and International Affairs at Harvard University's John F. Kennedy School of Government.

Bruce Parrot is professor and director of Soviet studies at the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies.

Simmon Sertfay is executive director of the Johns Hopkins Foreign Policy Institute, and research professor of U.S. foreign policy at the School of Advanced International Studies.

Jeremy J. Stone is president of the Federation of American Scientists.

Robert W. Tucker is Christian A. Herter Professor and director of American foreign policy at the School of Advanced International Studies.

Richard H. Ullman is David K. E. Bruce Professor of international affairs at Princeton University.

Contributors

AN AGENDA FOR THE FUTURE

Charles M. Balch, M.D., is professor and head, division of surgery; chairman of the department of general surgery; and professor of immunology, at the M.D. Anderson Cancer Center in Houston, Texas.

Jack N. Barkenbus is deputy director of the Energy, Environment and Resources Center, University of Tennessee at Knoxville, and of the Institute for Energy Analysis, Oak Ridge Associated University, Oak Ridge, Tennessee.

Paul Adam Blanchard is president of Space Research & Management, Inc.

Barry M. Blechman is fellow at the Johns Hopkins Foreign Policy Institute.

Laurence W. Brit is business manager for Xerox Technigraphic Products, Rochester, New York.

J. Ralph Broadwater, M.D., is assistant professor of surgery at the University of Arkansas for Medical Sciences, Little Rock, Arkansas.

John Logan Burrow is a practicing attorney who also serves as the popularly elected Coroner of Washington County, Arkansas.

Paul Chrzanowski is group leader, conducting systems-analysis activities in support of strategic-force modernization programs, at Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, Livermore, California.

William H. Dunlop is division leader for nuclear-weapons design at Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory.

Michael J. Edwards, M.D., is assistant professor of surgery at the University of Louisville, Kentucky.

John A. Fabey is associate professor emeritus of foreign languages and literature at Old Dominion University, Norfolk, Virginia.

Ann M. Florini is studies coordinator at the Center for International and Strategic Affairs at the University of California, Los Angeles.

Philip S. Gillette is associate professor of political science and the director of the graduate program in international studies at Old Dominion University, Norfolk, Virginia.

Ethan Gutmann is research assistant for the Conventional Balance Project at The Brookings Institution.
A Report to the Forty-First President

Stephen T. Kerr is professor of education and chairman of the department of curriculum and instruction in the College of Education at the University of Washington, Seattle.

John Marks is executive director of Serach for Common Ground.

David McClaive is senior research analyst (language specialist) in Soviet and East European Affairs at the Federal Research Division of the Library of Congress.

Peter H. Moulthrop works on arms-control issues at Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory.

Patricia O'Leary is professor of architecture at the University of Arkansas.

Jack Perry is director of the Dean Rusk Program in International Studies and professor of political science at Davidson College, Davidson, North Carolina.

William C. Potter is executive director of the Center for International and Strategic Affairs at the University of California, Los Angeles.

Alan Robock is associate professor of meteorology at the University of Maryland, College Park.

Thomas F. Rogers is president of The Sophron Foundation, McLean, Virginia.

Steven Rosefield is professor of economics at the University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill.

Merrick J. Ross, M.D., is junior faculty associate, department of surgery, M.D. Anderson Cancer Center.

George Seielstad is assistant director for Greenbank operations at the National Radio Astronomy Observatory, Greenbank, West Virginia.

George G. Staelhe has been a project leader for several warhead development programs and is also involved in studies on arms control at Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory.

Judith A. Thornton is professor of economics and director of the Institute for Economic Research at the University of Washington, Seattle.

Karen A. Weisblatt is administrator in the office of student activities at the American University in Paris, France.

Charles E. Ziegler is associate professor of Political Science at the University of Louisville.

Contributors

Acknowledgements

The consensus statement draws on papers written by Arthur Hartman, FPI Diplomat-in-Residence, Raymond L. Garthoff, The Brookings Institution, and Arnold Horowitz, RAND. It was drafted by Simon Serfaty, the project director, who also prepared this Report.

Proposals for the Agenda were selected with the assistance of Barry Blechman, William E. Colby, Burt Edelson, Joseph Fromm, and Alani Tonelson. Also involved in the selection process was Arthur Hartman, whose active participation in all phases of this project was very much appreciated.

The authors of the Agenda benefited greatly from the many experts from universities, government, and the private sector who attended the various meetings organized to present the drafts of their proposals. We are especially grateful for their interest and counsel, even though we cannot mention them all.

This project would not have been completed without the extraordinarily assiduous work of Michael T. Clark, who directed the production of all the publications it has generated, and Betty Lessner Katsner, who managed the program, including the organization of meetings and the distribution of the publications. We are deeply appreciative.

We also thank Alan Tonelson, who edited the full set of Agenda papers, and Lynda Barrow, Susan Thornton, Joan Klopfer, Jonathan Zuck, Jennifer Varrell, Pamela Stedman, Glenn Miles, and Isabel Juberdi Montaperto whose various contributions helped maintain this project on a strict and difficult schedule.

Finally, we are especially grateful for the interest and support provided by the Trustees and the staff of the W. Alton Jones Foundation whose generous grant funded this project.

Harold Brown
Chairman
Simon Serfaty
Executive Director
Foreign Policy Institute
THE JOHNS HOPKINS UNIVERSITY

Steven Muller
President

John V. Lombardi
Provost

THE JOHNS HOPKINS SCHOOL OF
ADVANCED INTERNATIONAL STUDIES

George R. Packard
Dean

George Crowell
Associate Dean

Robert A. Lystad
Associate Dean for Academic Affairs

THE JOHNS HOPKINS FOREIGN
POLICY INSTITUTE

Harold Brown
Chairman

Simon Serfaty
Executive Director

Barry M. Blechman
Fellow

Michael T. Clark
Managing Editor

Lynn E. Davis
Fellow

Alvin P. Drischler
Fellow

Burton I. Edelson
Fellow

Charles H. Fairbanks, Jr.
Fellow

Joseph Fromm
Fellow

Philip L. Geyelin
Editor-in-Residence

Carol Rae Hansen
Fellow

Arthur Hartman
Diplomat-in-Residence

Betty Lenson Katzner
Program Manager

Wilfrid L. Kohl
Director of the International Energy Program

Herman W. Nickel
Diplomat-in-Residence

Barry Rubin
Fellow

Hedrick Smith
Fellow

Paula Stern
Fellow

I. William Zartman
Director of the Program on Conflict Management