LIVING WITH THE SUMMITS

FROM RAMBOUILLET TO BONN

Simon Serfaty and Michael M. Harrison
FPI
POLICY
BRIEFS

LIVING WITH
THE SUMMITS
FROM RAMBOUILLET
TO BONN

Simon Serfaty and Michael M. Harrison

1. FROM RAMBOUILLET TO LONDON
   Background and Assessment

2. THE BONN SUMMIT
   A Preview
1. FROM RAMBOUILLET TO LONDON
BACKGROUND AND ASSESSMENT

The Bonn summit of the leading industrialized countries will be the eleventh in a series that began at Rambouillet, outside of Paris, in November 1975. The first summit was conceived as a private and nonrecurring meeting among a very few heads of state or government to discuss pressing economic issues and cut through institutional inertia to force quicker solutions of common problems. There was to be little pomp and limited background work, a small and flexible agenda, and a short final communiqué that would set general directions designed to overcome the rigidity of existing consultative bodies.

While some might argue that many of these guidelines were hardly met at Rambouillet, most observers agree that since 1976, summits have become what they were not expected to be: a process that every spring turns into a large, elaborate, institutionalized, highly bureaucratic, and media-oriented affair. The number and even the kinds of participants have expanded, as have the scope and nature of the issues discussed, so that the summits are now inherently complicated and often unruly meetings, buffeted by the claims and interests of contending national and subnational groups. Agreements reached at these summits are, of course, not binding. All too often, they reflect ritualistic and pious rhetoric on economic doctrines or a fragile, short-lived consensus on some pressing issue that usually requires a lengthy document which endures only a few weeks—or days, if not hours.*

Nevertheless, the banalization of the summits and their minimal impact on national policies do not mean that they are an insignificant part of the complex pattern of information-sharing, consultation, and even coordination of outlooks among the major industrialized states. Because these meetings involve leading Western political figures, they automatically become focal points in an ongoing process of policy-making that covers a broad range of economic, political, and even security issues preoccupying the most powerful noncommunist countries. For these and other reasons, the summits are of modest importance in Western diplomacy. Yet, any particular summit has had, and may still have, the potential

*Thus, the joint communiqué issued at Rambouillet consisted of fifteen paragraphs, and the language used was very general. In comparison, the communiqué issued after the Ottawa summit in 1981 included thirty-seven articles and two appendices, and it addressed problems more directly, as did the Venice and Tokyo communiqués which set specific goals for participants' growth rates and energy consumption. The wording of the communiqué issued at Versailles was being debated by key participants even before it was released.
to become a genuinely significant occasion, surprising both observers and even the participants themselves.

ORIGINS AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE SUMMITS

 Calls for regular summit meetings have a long and contentious history hardly limited to alliance relations. "jaw-jaw is better than war-war." Winston Churchill once noted, somewhat idiosyncratically, when he was advocating a Big Four meeting that would be held "in a friendly fashion, without agendas, with the sole purpose of trying to find a sensible way of living side by side in an atmosphere of growing trust, ease and happiness." In 1965 General Charles de Gaulle's proposal for a tripartite Western directorate over political and security affairs was shunted aside by the Eisenhower administration and remained for a time the most famous, or infamous, idea for regular Western summits—one that effectively disqualified limited-membership meetings for many years.

Nevertheless, such a quintessentially French approach to the management of Western issues was revived in the early 1970s, in response to problems arising from the collapse of the international monetary system after President Nixon's fateful decisions of August 1971 and, even more tangibly, in the midst of the energy crisis accompanying the Yom Kippur War in late 1973. These economic challenges found Western governments in disarray and grasping at contradictory policies that only increased their common difficulties. Western institutions or arrangements designed to deal with monetary and trade questions—including the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), and the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT)—seemed excessively strained or wholly unable to cope with the unprecedented magnitude of existing problems.

French reaction during this period of Western economic crisis was to stay aloof not only from middle-level multilateral schemes but also, because of French suspicion of American intentions, from such newly-created bodies as the International Energy Agency. Instead, in December 1974, the newly-elected French president, Valéry Giscard d'Estaing, revived the Gaullist approach, favoring policy coordination at the highest level, by creating the European Council and instituting three-annual summit meetings of what was to become the European Community's most powerful political institution.

Giscard's preference for high-level, personal diplomacy to address Western economic problems not only reflected a national bias but also be traced to his earlier experience as finance minister. At that time he had participated in secret meetings with his counterparts from West Germany, Britain, and the United States (and later, Japan) to review monetary problems. Discussions among this so-called Library Group were held periodically in the White House library after the February-March 1973 monetary crisis. The exchanges embraced all outstanding international economic issues and impressed the participants (including Helmut Schmidt and George Shultz) with the value of frank, private discussions at the highest level. In the United States, the Trilateral Commis-

sion was simultaneously promoting high-level coordination of economic policies, thereby inducing American opinion to favor the concept of economic summits.

FROM RAMBOUILLET TO LONDON

Buoyed by his success in developing the European Council, Giscard d'Estaing proposed a Western summit during the July 1975 Helsinki Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe. President Gerald Ford and secretary of state Henry Kissinger were at first unenthusiastic, but effective lobbying by Helmut Schmidt (by then West German chancellor) and others brought the Americans around, and the United States, West Germany, France, and Britain (with Harold Wilson as prime minister) agreed to appoint personal representatives to prepare the documents and agenda for a summit meeting. Japan accepted an offer to attend, while Italy's persistent need to be present at any major Western gathering led the government in Rome to press successfully for a belated invitation. Thus conceived as a small, high-level affair involving a few leaders and some of their closest advisers, the first summit meeting was held at the Château de Rambouillet from November 15 to 17, 1975. The six statesmen who attended—including Japan's Takeo Miki and Italy's Aldo Moro—did not plan to repeat what was widely considered a successful meeting, but, the following May, president Ford requested a follow-up session which was held outside San Juan, Puerto Rico, on June 27-28, 1976. After Puerto Rico, such summits became a regular feature of diplomacy among the leading Western states. Despite occasional (according to some) or frequent (according to others) disappointment over actual results, and at least one notable disaster at Versailles in 1982, the summits are now accepted as a permanent institution helping to coordinate policies within the industrialized West.

Although the inclusion of Italy at Rambouillet constituted a broader definition of leading industrialized states than what had been anticipated by Giscard, Ford further diluted the notion of an "inner club" at Puerto Rico when he insisted, in spite of European objections, on adding Canada to the group—raising national representation to seven, which has held ever since. The other modification in summit participation has been the inclusion of representatives from the European Economic Community (ECC). Perpetually concerned that the big powers would somehow injure their interests unless closely watched, Europe's smaller countries had urged ECC representation at Puerto Rico. While Giscard managed to scuttle this idea at a December 1975 meeting of the European Council, he was forced, at a similar session in Rome in March 1977, to accept summit participation of the presidents of both the European Council and the European Commission. The latter figure is the only bureaucrat who has attended summits at the level of a state leader, although the Common Market representatives may not participate in all deliberations and their influence is minimal except possibly among their European colleagues.

Perhaps the most conspicuous feature of the summits, in contrast to the original Giscardian model, is the elaborate preparation and publicity they have come to involve. Even the first Rambouillet meeting required extensive prenotification on the monetary agreement to be announced at the summit itself, a procedure that took most of the time of the French and American presidents' personal representatives—called "sherpas" after the Tibetan guides who help Himalayan mountain climbers. As the agenda of issues considered at each summit has grown longer, including political and security issues, officials of all foreign and economic ministries (and defense specialists, too) have been formally brought into the process to ensure that their departmental interests are protected. Also, since 1982, the seven finance and treasury ministers have met
a month or so before their superiors, to try to settle outstanding differences on complicated monetary and trade issues shaping the agenda of the forthcoming summit.

As far as the actual issues are concerned, then, the summits have hardly been a forum for spontaneous, personal diplomacy. Instead, they reflect laborious preparations designed to protect participants from embarrassing surprises and unexpected disagreements. In this sense, the summits are part of a continuous process of policy coordination that, once a year, emerges from the swamp of bureaucratic and lower-level, multilateral discussions to focus the attention, and even engage the reputations, of the highest political authorities in the West.

ISSUES AT THE SUMMITS

The summits were originally conceived as devices for discussion and coordination of economic policies among the most powerful Western industrialized states. The kinds of issues raised at Rambouillet were representative of those to be considered at future meetings: the international economic and monetary situation, energy, East-West trade, and relations with developing countries. Over the years, the prominence of any one issue at a given summit has varied according to the pressure of events and the perceived interests of leading participants—especially those from the United States, France, and West Germany, who often set the agenda and tone of each meeting and have been largely responsible for the outcome as well. In addition, summit participants have increasingly added noneconomic issues, both during the preparatory phase and the proceedings proper, so that summits now tend to function as a kind of catch-all for whatever issues most preoccupy leaders and their advisors during the months or even weeks preceding this annual spring rite.

In a more or less ascending order of importance, the following problems have been addressed at the ten summits held thus far:

North-South relations. With the main exception of the 1981 meeting in Ottawa, issues of North-South relations have scarcely been treated seriously, and their impact on participants’ policies has been almost nil. At Rambouillet, to be sure, there were calls for a more positive attitude toward less developed countries (LDCs) and for the IMF to help stabilize LDC export earnings as well as to finance payments imbalances. When Pierre Trudeau was Canada’s prime minister, he was the summits’ champion of the Third World; with an assist from François Mitterrand, he succeeded in focusing attention on Third World issues during the Ottawa meeting—which, of course, Trudeau hosted. Faced with the added pressure of a North-South conference scheduled for the following fall in Cancún, the Ottawa declaration attempted to articulate a united Western front and made reference to encouraging private as well as public flows of capital to developing countries—a fairly representative rhetorical compromise of diverging outlooks among the industrialized powers. The following year at Versailles, Mitterrand and Trudeau managed to include in the final communiqué a commitment in favor of “global negotiations” and cooperation in meeting the demands of the Group of 77. However, this kind of “commitment” remained without any practical effect, as has the agreement reached in London in 1984 for an “improved” program to ease LDC debt problems, to promote long-term direct investment in Third World countries, and to make Western markets more open for LDC exports.

Energy. Although the energy crisis was a major catalyst for the Rambouillet summit, it barely figured in the final communiqué, and, over the years, it has tended to play a major role only intermittently. Neglected in 1976, the issue was given considerable attention in 1977, when the participants pledged increased reliance on nuclear energy and agreed to study problems of nonproliferation safeguards and terms of reference for international fuel-cycle evaluation. After an energy lull in 1978, the Tokyo summit in 1979 occurred in the wake of the Iranian revolution and in the midst of the second oil crisis, and it found the European participants in sharp disagreement with the United States, Japan, and Canada over an appropriate response. Negotiations produced one notable success, however, and, bowing to European pressure, all participants agreed to limit oil imports to specified levels. The Venice summit the following year was the last meeting where energy played a prominent role. Studies commissioned three years earlier in London were presented, and Western leaders agreed to reduce their collective 1980 oil import targets by four million barrels a day. They also accepted a number of steps intended to limit oil consumption, to promote their own oil production, and to conserve energy in the future.

Domestic economic policies. Coordination of economic policies was first debated in London in 1977, when the newly-elected U.S. president, Jimmy Carter, proposed an expansionist strategy (labeled the “locomotive” theory) according to which strong surplus countries like West Germany and Japan would help pull weaker powers out of stagnation. While specific growth targets were adopted at London, they were not subsequently met. In Bonn the following year, a comprehensive joint program for coordinated economic policies among Western powers was adopted under the new “cowboy” theory. Carefully worked out during the preparatory meetings, the program committed the participants to specific expansionist and anti-inflationary measures, including higher public deficits in France, reduced tax cuts in the United States, and specific growth targets for West Germany and Japan.

This agreement was relatively successful to the extent that participants at least tried to honor their pledges, but it was later greatly criticized, especially in Germany, where the policies it entailed were considered inflationary. In any case, the 1979 oil crisis undermined the macroeconomic plans and intentions of the Bonn summit. Since 1978, no such comprehensive coordination of domestic economic policies has truly been attempted. However, philosophies of growth have been recurrently debated, as in Ottawa where Reagan and Mitterrand confronted each other to little avail.* In general, coordination of macroeconomic policies has truly been attempted.

*Yet, in what amounted to a tribute to the success of the Reagan administration in creating new jobs, the communiqué that followed the 1984 London summit noted: "We emphasize the need for sustained growth and creation of new jobs ... We must encourage removal of rigidities in the labor market." The then-finance minister of France, Jacques Delors, having paid tribute to the "dynamism" of the American economy, added: "We do it our way, and they do it their way, but since it seems to be working for them, it's worthwhile looking at it. That's not only a lesson in humility, but in realism."
policies among states does not work well even among closely-linked Common Market countries, and the declining reputation of Keynesian approaches, in an era marked by the ascendancy of supply-side economics, makes the idea less appealing.

Trade relations. Not surprisingly, economic summits among industrialized countries that rely so much on trade for their mutual well-being, have devoted considerable attention to trade issues. Ever since Rambouillet, summit participants have regularly carried out the ritual of renewing their declared commitments to maintaining free trade, encouraging new trade negotiations, and resisting trends toward protectionism.

"What the world calls the crisis of capitalism," Giscard noted, "is in reality a monetary crisis."

There are numerous reasons, however, why these efforts to improve trade relations have remained ineffective. One problem is that trade issues are complex, subject to sector-by-sector negotiations or bilateral agreements rather than to the broad political approach followed in such summits. Another factor is that powerful domestic interests give rise to demands for protectionist legislation that can scarcely be managed through such meetings. At best, leaders may resort to ritual support for free trade to try to hold back what is becoming a major trend favoring the incremental dismantling of an open trading system. As this trend has become more powerful, such efforts have proven to be more difficult. In 1984, for example, the London communiqué agreed to accelerate trade liberalization programs and echoed a traditional, stern rejection of "protectionist measures," but in response to reservations by France and Italy, the communiqué stopped short of endorsing a Japanese-American initiative for a new round of multilateral trade negotiations beginning in 1986.

Monetary policy. This is perhaps the most important economic question debated at the summits. It was prominent at Rambouillet and later at Versailles and Williamsburg, and it can be expected to reappear with regularity as long as the current, unregulated floating rate system remains in effect and as long as wide variations in the value of the dollar play havoc with international trade and finance. Bitter exchanges between the United States and France (a traditional advocate of a reformed international monetary system that would reduce the role and privileges of the U.S. dollar), followed by unsatisfactory compromises in public and continued disagreement in private, persist as a feature of debate on this question.

For the French, an important motive behind the first summit was Giscard d'Estaing's conviction that post-Bretton Woods monetary affairs could not be managed by existing multilateral institutions such as the IMF. "What the world calls the crisis of capitalism," Giscard noted at the time, "is in reality a monetary crisis." Paris advocated a return to fixed exchange rates but gradually lost European support for this position, while the United States became more and more attached to a permanent float. In negotiations preceding Rambouillet, American and French representatives worked out an agreement sanctioning the U.S. position in favor of the status quo, although Washington indicated a willingness to prevent excessive and erratic fluctuations of the dollar. The deal was announced at the summit and subsequently ratified in the Jamaica agreements of January 1976.

The precedent of profiting from the summit calendar to focus negotiations on adjustments in the monetary system was repeated at the 1982 Versailles summit that shaped an ongoing conflict between Reagan's free-market orientation and the French socialist penchant for intervention. In contrast to Rambouillet, the agreement worked out in pre-Versailles meetings (at the ministerial level) favored more stability in the international monetary system. This was not merely an act of deference to the host country. It also reflected Reagan's desire to secure concessions on East-West trade (and, one suspects, to maintain France's support on behalf of Intermediate Nuclear Force (INF) deployment). Thus, the Versailles communiqué announced the leaders' acceptance of "a joint responsibility to work for greater stability of the world monetary system," and it prohibited competitive devaluation, provided for possible government intervention in the foreign exchange markets in accordance with IMF statutes, and, finally, it delegated a monitoring role to the five Special Drawing Rights countries along with the IMF.

Although the Versailles agreement was hailed as a success at the time, it had little effect in stabilizing the monetary system—particularly since the United States clung to a narrow definition of the "exceptional circumstances" that would justify intervention in the foreign exchange markets. By the time of Williamsburg, Mitterrand was trying to implement the vague proposal he had made at an OECD meeting to call a Bretton Woods-like conference in order to create a new monetary system. Yet, when the proposal gained little support from other participants, the French president had to back down in the face of American resistance that proved to be all the more decisive as earlier preoccupations over issues of East-West trade had receded somewhat (and Mitterrand's earlier speech to the German Bundestag had helped secure German acceptance of IMF deployment). A "compromise" statement was graciously included in the final communiqué, calling for the seven finance ministers and the IMF to find ways to improve the existing international monetary system and to "consider" what role might be played by an eventual high-level conference. This, however, hardly amounted to new policy, and questions concerning the definition of the international monetary regime are likely to plague Bonn and future summits.

Foreign relations and security. Although originally conceived as a forum for the sole discussion of economic affairs, Western summits have increasingly embraced more exclusively political and foreign-policy questions. To be sure, this was always the case in private meetings held outside the formal debates on the public agenda. However, the intensification of public focus on political issues, after Rambouillet, can be attributed to three considerations. First, the participants are now less especially competent in economic issues—particularly since 1981, with the departure of Giscard d'Estaing and then Helmut Schmidt. Second, since the late 1970s, the general collapse of détente and a growing concern in Europe (and Japan) over the rise of Soviet military capabilities have turned problems of East-West relations (including economic ties and security questions) into items of natural priority each year. Finally, the summits represent the only real opportunity to discuss and perhaps coordinate Western security policies at the highest level—because of the participation of countries outside the NATO framework, that is, France (a partial NATO member) and, of course, Japan.
The first inclusion of a “political” issue in a summit communiqué came at Bonn in 1978, with a special declaration on air piracy. However, the event that caused a formal expansion of summit agendas to include foreign-policy issues was the restricted, four-power Western summit held at Guadaloupe in January 1979 to discuss the SALT negotiations. With Canada, Japan, and Italy publicly resentful of their exclusion from such debates, the seven agreed, at Tokyo the following June, that political issues would henceforth be considered legitimate items for their formal summit agendas.

This decision has produced mixed results. From 1980 through 1982, with the participants clearly in odds in their reactions to the major crises that shaped the general deterioration in East-West relations, discussions at the summits (Venice, Ottawa, and Versailles) exposed their disagreements, and even exacerbated them, instead of providing an opportunity for compromise and policy coordination. The 1980 summit, for example, was dominated by the American hostage crisis in Iran and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, and in both cases American and European positions were scarcely reconcilable. Both Paris and Bonn adamantly refused to go beyond the European Council’s call for a withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan, and, to the intense displeasure of president Carter, summit participants also failed to take a strong stand on the situation in Iran. East-West issues continued to play a prominent role at Ottawa and Versailles, both marked by sharp disagreements between the United States and the Europeans over the latter’s financing of the Siberian pipeline project and the strategic implications of their trade with Eastern countries. The compromise that was painfully reached at Versailles stressed new controls on exports of strategic goods and more stringent guidelines for economic relations with the East (including credit conditions). However, this fragile agreement collapsed immediately after it was announced, and the Reagan administration imposed an embargo on supplies to the pipeline project that infuriated Europeans and precipitated a sharp crisis in U.S.-European relations. This issue festered until the end of 1983 when it was settled on terms that proved to be reasonably cognizant of the European position, thereby paving the way for significant improvement in U.S.-European relations.

Since Versailles, discussion of foreign policy and security issues has been more carefully controlled to avoid comparable difficulties. Because East-West trade issues were receding by the time of the Williamsburg session in May 1983, this summit was notable primarily for its declaration on security. The declaration issued by the seven confirmed their mutual interest in meaningful arms reductions, supported the U.S. position in the INF negotiations, and reiterated that French and British nuclear forces should be excluded from such negotiations. The unity of the seven governments was generally underlined by the statement that their security was “indivisible,” a surprising declaration that associated Japanese with Western security policies. The Williamsburg security declaration represented a departure from the usually controlled course of events at these summits, since the document was apparently not prepared in advance.

*The earliest political discussion held at the summits may also have been the most awkward. In the course of informal meetings held in Puerto Rico, the United States, West Germany, France, and Britain decided to support an ERO loan to Italy, contingent on Rome’s exclusion of the then-senator Communist party from the government. This incursion in the domestic affairs of a participant, later revealed by Helmut Schmidt, has not been repeated.

but instead was actually drafted, and agreed upon, at the summit itself under the astute prodding of a well-prepared President Reagan.

AN ASSESSMENT

The institutionalization of summit meetings has grown out of the widely-shared belief that intra-allied differences reflect a structural problem that could best be ameliorated through better consultation procedures. In truth, however, there is no structure that could succeed in achieving and sustaining an operational consensus among democratic and sovereign states when there is no basis for agreement: the inability of the seven to coordinate their economic policies is a case in point, as is their failure to agree on monetary reforms. It is repeatedly assumed that more consultation would permit less friction and more coherence. Past experience shows that this principle can also work the other way around, as summits have sometimes helped publicize and even exacerbate the allies’ differences during the spring that precedes their yearly encounters.

To be sure, meetings, in whatever form, do permit potentially helpful tours d’horizon, provided that sessions are not exceedingly regimented and that participants speak with a frankness that eschews grandstanding and deception. (At Ottawa, for example, the newly-elected French socialists’ government appeared to be “convinced” by President Reagan that U.S. interest rates would go down and the American economy would be back in full gear before the end of the year, a “mistake” that proved to be costly.) In addition, such meetings have an educational value, as they expose their participants to the perceptions and difficulties of their counterparts on a wide range of important questions. This advantage is especially significant when new leaders emerge on the world scene, as was the case in Ottawa, where four of the seven main participants were new heads of state or government. On occasion these meetings may also lead to substantive results, as was the case in Rambouillet, Tokyo, and Williamsburg.

On occasion, these meetings may lead to substantive results, as was the case in Rambouillet, Tokyo, and Williamsburg.

All too often, however, summit communiqués reflect a marked predilection for the desirable over the feasible. Thus, in 1976 in Bonn, the participants “agreed” on unemployment as their “main concern”; in 1979 in Tokyo, “the most urgent task” was said to be to “reduce oil consumption”; in 1980 in Venice, the “first priority” was inflation; in 1981 in Ottawa, the “highest priority” was both inflation and unemployment; in 1982 at Versailles, the “improvement of the present situation” was said to require “a further reduction of inflation and a return to steady growth at high levels of employment”; in 1983 at Williamsburg, the commitment was to “halt protectionism and, as the recovery proceeds, to reverse it by dismantling trade barriers”; and in 1984 in London, Western leaders warned that high interest rates, budget and trade imbalances, and...
The summit does not create a consensus but presupposes it, and joint declarations do not describe an agreement but often imagine it.

Does this mean that the summits launched in 1975 have outlived their usefulness and should now be discontinued? Probably not. Like so many other facets of alliance relations, undoing an existing arrangement might prove to be self-defeating—at times of relative cooperation because this would deny leaders the ability to emphasize Western cohesion to domestic constituencies and adversaries abroad, and at times of discord because this might exaggerate the scope and depth of the disagreement. The ten summits held thus far do show, however, that not much can and should be expected of meetings which endure to the extent that their participants remain satisfied with the articulation of the least common denominator among them.

2.
THE BONN SUMMIT
A PREVIEW

Growing conflicts between the United States and Japan over trade; lingering discord between the United States and France over international monetary reforms; and general uncertainties among the allies over the scope of their support for, and the nature of their participation in, President Reagan's Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI), are the most salient issues shaping the eleventh summit of the industrialized countries to be held in Bonn from May 2 to 4, 1986. Yet, it has become increasingly likely that differences voiced during the weeks preceding this annual encounter will be sufficiently muted to present, at home and abroad, a facade of Western unity compatible with the currently good state of alliance relations.

THE PARTICIPANTS

Previous Western summits have been timely and useful occasions for new leaders to become personally acquainted and directly exposed to their colleagues' preoccupations. Indeed, because concrete decisions of specific significance are rare at such meetings, or because they could easily be taken in other forums, this interaction is often cited as the single most fruitful result of these summits. Such was the case at Ottawa in 1981, for example. In Bonn, however, with the sole exception of Canada's prime minister, Brian Mulroney, the leaders who will be present are all "old hands" at these affairs and know each other well: Ronald Reagan and François Mitterrand have been attending the summits since 1981 (Ottawa), and Helmut Kohl and Yasuhiro Nakasone since 1985 (Williamsburg). Italy's Bettino Craxi first came last year in London, while Margaret Thatcher, whose participation began in 1979 (Tokyo), is now the doyenne of Western leaders. Finally, as France's finance minister, Jacques Delors (now president of the European Community Commission) has been involved in all summits held since 1981.

Ideological differences that have sometimes plagued past summits, especially on questions of economic policy and aid to Third World countries, are unlikely to arise in Bonn. Despite the political distance that separates some of the participants, the Bonn summit finds all Western countries pursuing unusually harmonious domestic economic policies that stress austerity and control of inflation. In addition, Tradesc's retirement has removed the last consistent advocate of Third World issues, so that the strongly different perspectives that disrupted the Ottawa and Versailles meetings will not be much in evidence in Bonn.
Mounting congressional and public pressures on behalf of protectionism may help promote an agreement on new trade negotiations.

Nevertheless, all seven Western leaders will arrive at the summit with distinctive national, political, and economic concerns that will affect their behavior and outlook during the conference. These can be summarized as follows:

**United States.** Ronald Reagan's 1984 election landslide, his strong and obvious popularity at home and abroad, and the widely-recognized success of his domestic and foreign policies place him in a stronger position than any of the other leaders. The performance of the American economy (a 6.8% growth rate in 1984, as compared to a 2.3% average in the four largest European economies, and a 5.5% rate in Japan) leaves the United States as the acknowledged "locomotive" which has pushed expansion in other industrialized countries. Alone should enable Reagan to resist criticism of American monetary policy and contain attacks on the budget deficit. If anything, his position on these issues will be even more compelling than it was in London last year, when Delors dramatically conceded the inability of the other participants to affect U.S. decisions.*

Reagan's summit priorities will be, first, to placate domestic criticism of the record $126 billion trade deficit and to obtain final agreement on his call for a new round of trade negotiations; and, second, to put off critics at home by presenting his arms-control policies as part of a unified Western effort. Allied governments are likely to resist any U.S. attempt to issue a political statement on SDI comparable to what was issued on INF at the Williamsburg summit. Yet, Reagan should be able to gain general support for U.S. positions in Geneva, in terms vague enough to permit him to claim a measure of success on SDI. Similarly, in inducing the allies to firm up an agreement on a new round of trade negotiations, mounting congressional and public pressures on behalf of protectionism may prove to be useful, even though they put some strain on the fervent Reagan belief that a combination of growth and free trade are panaceas for Western economies. Whatever else is included in the communique, results in these two areas should be enough to leave the American president satisfied.

**Japan.** Premier Nakasone enjoys perhaps the healthiest and least self-indulgent economy in the West, with an anticipated 4% growth rate in 1986, inflation at only 2.2% last year, and unemployment at 2.2%. As usual, though, Japan's trade surplus ($44 billion in 1984) will be a major issue with the other summit participants who are mounting another attack against Japanese trade barriers. Nakasone's pre-summit efforts to divert criticism with the fourth spurt of market-opening activities during his 3½ years in office lack credibility with many of his colleagues. Yet, with the strong man of the ruling Liberal Democratic Party (LDP), Kakuei Tanaka, seriously ill, the resulting uncertainties within the LDP may make it difficult for Nakasone to make specific concessions that would hurt important domestic interests tied to his party.

Japan's attempts to appease its Western partners before the summit, and avoid uneconomic confrontations with the Japanese, progress or lack of it in the negotiations with the United States will affect the tone of trade discussions.

---

*After the final session held in London, Delors was asked if France now recognized the dominance of the United States in the global economy. "If the Galleon rosters," Delors answered, "we're to pluck the bottom of the American elephant, it would not change anything about the size of the elephant."

---

**THE BONN SUMMIT**

on the Rhine. Nakasone's agreement on a new Brussels round of trade talks will be designed to reduce some of the friction with Japan, while stunting the growth of protectionist sentiment in the United States.

**West Germany.** Helmut Kohl's role as host requires that he encourage his guests to reconcile policy differences in order to enable him to create the impression of a successful summit. This is an appropriate position for a chancellor reputed to have minimalistic expectations about such meetings. At a time when the German economy shows signs of some sluggishness (a 2% growth rate in 1984), the government is especially anxious to keep inflation low (3% in 1984) and hold on to a trade surplus that amounted to $19 billion last year. Kohl's main interest is, therefore, to avoid specific commitments to stimulate growth in West Germany, a move which, he fears, might be inflationary, as proved to be the case following the previous Bonn summit in 1978.

Kohl's performance will be closely watched at home where his leadership capabilities are questioned and his opposition—helped by a record 10.6% rate of unemployment—continues to make political life difficult for the government coalition of Christian Democrats and Free Democrats. Because Kohl has confirmed West German interest in sustaining good relations with the East, he can be expected to stress European hopes for a revived détente rather than give in to any more skeptical approach. From this standpoint, the anticipated meeting between Reagan and Mikhail Gorbachev has already provided the German chancellor with much satisfaction, and it is likely that Western leaders will find it possible to make a positive reference in the final communicé to this long-awaited meeting.

**France.** If Reagan holds the strongest political position at the summit, François Mitterrand appears to have the weakest. A troubled French economy is only barely recovering from the ill-conceived expansionary policies pursued during the first two years of socialist rule, and the recently-announced reform of France's electoral laws has confirmed the overall perception of a French Left scrambling to slow down the erosion of its political strength. Although France's inflation rate follows the general Western trend downward (6.7% in 1984, versus 11.1% the previous year), it is still relatively high. Conversely, the French annual growth rate (2.1%) is low, while the massive annual trade deficits (now reduced to $2.5 billion) are only at a precarious stage of recovery.

Furthermore, Mitterrand faces legislative elections in 1986 that are almost certain to deprive him of a stable parliamentary majority and may indeed place the country in the same sort of political stalemate that existed in the heyday of the Fourth Republic—thereby raising questions about the very survival of Mitterrand's presidency through his 1988 term. Little that happens at the summit could be effective in boosting his low popularity, not even a full endorsement of his call for international monetary reforms. This, however, is an unlikely prospect in the light of the opposition France continues to face on the issue.

Mitterrand's objective has been to limit the summit to an almost exclusive discussion of economic issues. More specifically, he has attempted to exclude political statements that are sought by the United States, either on the question of terrorism (which affects the French tradition of political asylum) or on
FPI POLICY BRIEFS

The British economy is in a phase of long-term, secular decline that cannot be reversed by draconian market-oriented policies.

Britain. Margaret Thatcher holds an important personal position among Western leaders as the most experienced and the most likely to remain in power for the foreseeable future. In the aftermath of an acrimonious miners' strike (which has benefited the centrist coalition of Liberals and Social Democrats), she is currently not as popular at home as she was a year ago. Most observers would agree that the British economy is in a phase of long-term, secular decline that cannot be reversed by Thatcher's draconian market-oriented policies. Indeed, Britain's current growth rate is near the bottom of the pole (2.3%), industrial production has actually dropped for most of the past year (while it increased in every other important industrialized country), inflation remains at 6.4%, and the trade deficit stands at £6.3 billion. Thatcher's summit priorities are difficult to ascertain, but she will certainly wish to reinforce her image as the senior political figure of the West, and, on the basis of her closeness, personal relationship with President Reagan, bolster Britain's claimed position as America's special partner.

Italy. This country's main interest at the Western summits is to be present and counted rather than to assert any particular interests. *Prime Minister Bettino Craxi is probably thankful that he can still attend this summit, since it marks nearly two years in office—an unusually long period in Italian politics. While experience shows that a good economic performance in Italy is often achieved in spite, rather than because, of the government, Craxi's austerity-minded policies can take some credit for bringing inflation rates down from 16.9% when he took power in 1983, to 10.6% in 1984. Italy's growth rate of 2.8% in 1984 was one of the highest in Western Europe, but the country remains plagued by astronomical interest rates, a huge public debt, and a projected 1985 budget deficit of $50 billion (or 15% of the GNP), as compared to about 6% in the United States. Italy's export-dependent economy is showing annual $3.5 billion trade deficit, a situation expected to worsen during 1985 as domestic recovery stimulates imports more than exports.

Canada. In power since September 1984, Brian Mulroney's Progressive Conservative party has eschewed Trudeau's more nationalistic approach, and the new prime minister is aligning himself more closely with American foreign and economic policies. Thus, Reagan's recent visit to Canada saw the dissipation of many of the outstanding U.S.-Canadian disagreements and some progress on the troublesome acid rain issue. The American economic revival has helped pull Canada out of its traumatic 1981-82 recession, as shown by an annual 3.8% growth rate, relatively low inflation (3.7%), and a solid $15 billion annual trade surplus. Hampered by a persistently high 11% rate of unemployment and a considerable budget deficit ($15 billion, or 8% of Canada's gross national product, Canada is seriously concerned over rising protectionist sentiment.

*As Henry Kissinger has written, somewhat exquisitely, "Whatever the reason, each visit [to Italy] left me with the feeling that its primary purpose was fulfilled at our arrival at the airport. This symbolized that the United States took Italy seriously; it produced photographic evidence that Italian leaders were being consulted. The achieved, Italian ministers act as if they were too worthy to permit that their views on international affairs could deceptively affect events." White House Years (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1979), p. 151.

THE BONN SUMMIT

evidenced by its leading trade partner, and Mulroney can be counted upon to support the free trade policies sought by the Reagan administration. Indeed, unlike his predecessor, Mulroney is likely to abstain from any sharp criticism of U.S. policies and should remain satisfied with a low profile.

SUMMIT ISSUES: TRADE, MONEY, AND DEFENSE

Trade

If the summit follows the preferred American scenario, the major decision will be the official announcement of a new round of multilateral trade talks—to begin in Brussels in 1986—as agreed at the OECD ministerial meeting held in mid-April. The main stumbling block to a final agreement has been the French refusal to set a date without a firm American commitment to hold a monetary conference as well. While other European countries have shared French preoccupation with the erratic behavior of the U.S. dollar, they have not been prepared to link money and trade in the same fashion and, instead, have tended to support a new GATT round on the grounds that it may pave the way for sustained export-led growth among all industrialized countries.

From the American perspective, an agreement on trade negotiations is especially critical in order to offset the ever-more-visible rise of protectionist sentiment in Congress and in some parts of the country. Although the U.S. trade deficit ($123 billion in 1984, and growing) is spread widely among the OECD countries, American resentment has focused on Japan where, it is argued, high tariffs in certain sectors, plus a variety of non-tariff barriers, place U.S. exporters at an unfair disadvantage and may account for as much as $10 billion of last year's $87 billion trade deficit between the two countries.

The resulting protectionist sentiment may become uncontrollable, and this represents a potential danger to an administration generally committed to free trade. Yet, it has been useful in forcing upon the Japanese a sense of urgency that strengthened a package of liberalization measures designed to promote imports in Japan, simplify bureaucratic rules and licensing procedures, lower tariffs on some products, and open up government-sponsored decisions in key industrial sectors to foreign-owned firms in Japan. For the United States, the key test of Japanese intentions is their willingness to open their telecommunication markets to the very competitive American equipment. This is not, however, the sort of specific agreement that will be sought and discussed at a multinational meeting such as Bonn, where Japan is likely to limit its commitment to a general pledge to reduce its large trade surplus.

Monetary Policy

The impact of monetary issues in Bonn remains uncertain, given conflicting French and American aims that persist despite the mutual concessions made at the mid-April OECD meeting. A long-standing French objective at these summits has been to induce other countries to agree to revise or even abandon
the floating rate system and design, in due time, a new Bretton Woods arrange-
ment to replace the one that collapsed in the early 1970s. Mitterrand has there-
fore held an agreement on new trade negotiations hostage to American con-
sent to such a monetary conference.

The American position has been to resist any serious restructuring of the current
system. The dominant view within the Reagan administration is that market
forces cannot and should not be thwarted in the long run, and that the cur-
rently strong dollar is merely a reflection of the inherent vitality of the American
economy. Consequently, the Reagan solution to exchange rate disparities is
a more open international trading system and stimulated growth abroad that
will result in more even trade balances and, eventually, more reasonable cur-
currency values.

A mid-April announcement by Secretary of the Treasury James A. Baker, III,
has not fully bridged these differences. "The United States," Baker told the
OEC2 country ministerial meeting, "is prepared to consider the possible value of hosting
a high-level meeting of the major industrial countries." But, notwithstanding the
cautions with which Secretary Baker presented the "possibility" of such
a conference, the sort of "changes" that would be explored remained limited to
refining the operation of floating exchange rates through better coordina-
tion of the countries' underlying economic policies—a very different objective
from the one sought by France since the beginning of these summits.

Despite important differences in philosophy, the practical significance of
divergent Western approaches on this issue is perhaps not so great, given a
recent trend toward limited American intervention in foreign exchange markets
and acknowledgement outside the United States that an ostensibly overvalued
dollar presents some significant advantages. Early this year, then-Secretary of
the Treasury Donald T. Regan renewed an earlier commitment to intervene in "disorderly" currency markets, and he even seemed to broaden the criteria
for American central bank cooperation with others. In early February, this
was followed by the most massive, coordinated European intervention in the ex-
change market since 1976, with central banks committing around $8 billion
over a few days (including a modest $40 million U.S. contribution). This "new"
American attitude is mostly symbolic significance, since the consensus on both
sides of the Atlantic now is that government interventions cannot have
much effect on foreign exchange markets that involve transactions of $100 billion
or more in a single day. This view is supported by the conclusions of the Ver-
sailles study, written by a French official, which reportedly noted that, at best,
such interventions can only smooth out exaggerated fluctuations but other-
wise cannot counter basic market trends.

A general lack of enthusiasm for embarking on an arduous effort to redesign
the monetary system is reinforced by the advantages other economies enjoy
from a strong dollar and by some recent developments that reduce pressures
outside the United States to weaken the dollar's value. Although all allies with
the exception of Japan, often complain about an overvalued dollar that attracts
capital away from other economies, American trading partners also know that
their improved trade balances are partly due to favorable exchange rates. For
example, French exports to the United States have enjoyed a 50% increase

in 1984, while Third World markets have shifted from U.S. suppliers to their
competitors. Furthermore, the recent drop in the value of the dollar has placed
its current exchange rate at a more acceptable level and thus tends to confirm
Reagan's argument that market forces can make the required adjustments on
their own. Finally, to the extent that budget deficits have been a major factor
contributing to high American interest rates and corresponding international
demand for dollars, improved prospects for reducing these deficits in current
American budget planning meet the principal objections of critics such as
Thatcher. Indeed, apart from the French, the strongest pressure to attack the
dollar's high standing comes from domestic American farming and manufac-
turing interests suffering from recent exchange rates, and Reagan is likely
to find his negotiations with the allies in Bonn easier than his talks with powerful,
domestic interest groups and the Congress.

Western Security

In the realm of foreign affairs and security, attention will focus on the allies' attitudes toward President Reagan's Strategic Defense Initiative. Reagan would
obviously welcome a statement of support on the part of his Western partners.
Yet, the ambivalence of European governments (and Canada) toward SDI is likely
to preclude any such statement. At best, SDI may find its way into a declaration which, while supportive of the anticipated meeting between Reagan
and Gorbachev, would endorse the U.S. position at the Geneva arms talks and approve U.S. research on the military use of space in the light of similar Soviet
efforts. Nevertheless, 1986 begins what may prove to be years of wrangling
over SDI. What happens in Bonn will be an interesting indication of how alliance
politics are shaping up in the early stages of this new controversy.

Having successfully contained public opposition to the deployment of in-
termediate nuclear forces, European governments now risk arousing their
publics out of the indifference they have shown thus far toward President Reagan's defense initiative. The principal allied concern stems from the implica-
tions SDI has or may have on ongoing arms-control talks in Geneva, and, accordingly, on domestic politics as well. European interests in Geneva are varied, including a hope that such negotiations will stabilize or even reduce the levels of super-
power nuclear confrontation on the continent, while also capping and eventually
reducing American and Soviet strategic arsenals in a way that would shore up nuclear deterrence rather than destabilize it.

In this context, European governments initially appeared to support SDI essen-
tially as a bargaining chip to bring Moscow back to the negotiating table and
to induce the superpowers to discuss existing offensive arms systems without jeopardizing past accomplishments such as the ABM treaty. Now, however,
European governments fear that Washington has transformed SDI into a
planned and ostensibly nonnegotiable system that will undermine the founda-
tions of nuclear deterrence. Thus, having encouraged Moscow's return to
Geneva, SDI might precipitate a deadlock that would revive factionalism and
move Europe closer to another debate over the nature of their security ties with the United States—a debate which they would find even more difficult to manage than in 1981-82. Accordingly, the European
european governments fear that Washington has transformed SDI into a nonnegotiable system that will under-
leaders at Bonn are concerned that, under the stature prodding of a new Soviet leadership better suited to the theatrics of modern-day diplomacy, SDFIs might poison political relations all around—at home, among the allies, and between the two superpowers.

The strategic implications and uncertainties of SDFIs have intensified allied qualms. One possible development would be the deployment of a successful missile defense system that might erode or even eliminate the thin, unstable foundations of a nuclear deterrent strategy based on mutual assured destruction. This would open up a Pandora’s box of problems such as a greatly expanded reliance on conventional strategies and forces, or even the decoupling of European and American security, since such a defense system might protect the American homeland but leave Europe exposed to both nuclear and conventional warfare. The implications are unclear at this stage, but considerations such as these have induced all allied governments to express reservations toward SDFIs beyond the research phase. In some cases, these have been phrased rather sharply, to say the least—for example, British Foreign Secretary Geoffrey Howe’s reference to SDFI as a potential “Magnitine Line,” or French Defense Minister Charles Herms’s perception of a possible superpower “complacency” that would leave Europe defenseless and subordinate.

The French have been the most troubled over SDFIs since it poses a twin threat to both the French nuclear deterrent and the bilateral superpower deterrence, based on mutual vulnerability, that validates a small nuclear force. Although there has been some confusion in Paris on the matter (Minister of External Affairs Roland Dumas has been more tolerant than defense officials), growing French concern is reflected in a series of diplomatic initiatives aimed at creating a unified European front in the face of American pressure on behalf of SDFIs. Ongoing European efforts to coordinate policy in this area are being stimulated by an American offer to allow NATO allies (along with Japan, Australia, and Israel) to participate in a five-year, $26 billion project to develop SDFI technology. Although poorly presented by Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger, the American offer is likely to be accepted by many, if not most, allies. Considering that all European governments are now preoccupied by Europe’s lagging technological capabilities and are fearful of being, as Chancellor Kohl has put it, “technologically decoupled from space weapons research,” it does not seem possible that the French conception of a European-centered project focused on space research could succeed unless somehow linked to the more advanced American effort.

Prospects for other political statements are even more dim. For instance, U.S.-sponsored efforts to achieve a common stand against international terrorism are likely to fail. While Britain and Italy favor the idea, France is sensitive to her reputation as a haven for political “refugees” of all kinds, while Japan and West Germany would prefer to stay out of the matter altogether. Thus, this summit’s only certain contribution to diplomacy will be to make facile declarations of Western unity and international reconciliation on the occasion of the fortieth anniversary of the end of World War II in Europe (May 8, 1945). This, of course, will satisfy the participants’ German host, and it is indeed no coincidence that the Bonn summit is being held at this particular time of the year, a few weeks earlier than usual.

REAGAN’S SUMMIT

As has been the case at most summits, the final Bonn communiqué will be phrased in such a way as to enable every head of state or government to claim a measure of satisfaction: because of having stood up to the senior American partner or having gone along with him, and because of what was said and leaked or what was not discussed or explained.

Yet there is every reason to believe that President Reagan will once again emerge as the dominant force in Bonn and will return from the summit satisfied on most accounts. Personally well-liked by his Western colleagues, Reagan has also gained considerable popularity in Europe, especially in countries, such as France, now run by socialist governments. Since the debacle at Versailles in 1982—when he appeared very tentative and ill-prepared—Reagan has gone to these summits well-briefed and ready to take charge. His economic policies face more criticism at home than abroad where governments are especially envious of the American president’s performance in creating new jobs. While America’s allies fear the strength of the U.S. dollar and would welcome an end to high U.S. budget deficits and real interest rates, they now understand not only the limits of their influence in these areas, but also the benefits which they gain out of the dollar’s high value. Finally, sensitive to protectionist pressure in the United States, and perceiving it as one element in a larger pattern of American drift toward disengagement from world affairs (or at least from a past Atlantic orientation), the Western allies are aware that the time has come for a new round of trade negotiations that would restore better trade balances and relations.

It is in the area of noneconomic issues, though, that Reagan’s “success” in Bonn is unlikely to match his 1982 performance in Williamsburg. Because the Geneva talks have just resumed, because a likely Reagan-Gorbachev meeting next fall has just been announced, and because the debate in Washington on SDFIs is now being launched, this may well be the best possible time for the U.S. administration to seek to European endorsement of its efforts in space. Expectations are running high, and, as he has done with Congress, Reagan can make the case that a display of unity will strengthen his hand in Geneva. Next year, as the Geneva talks get bogged down, as the Reagan-Gorbachev meeting is forgotten (or, through an agreement on more regular meetings, routinized), and as the American debate on SDFIs gains momentum, a political statement on security issues will probably be even more difficult to secure. In sum, Bonn may present the optimum occasion to secure allied support for SDFIs. However, because the six summit partners have such conflicting interests in this issue and are only now developing their policies, it seems that Reagan will not obtain the kind of support he has been seeking, and he will have to accept less than his maximal goals in this area.

For the past two years, the American management of alliance relations has been generally solid and effective. However, the many issues that have persistently hampered alliance relations in the past have hardly disappeared. Whether in the areas of trade, money, or defense, these questions will not be dissipated at the Bonn summit. Indeed, the summit is taking place at a time when many key disputes are reviving or escalating or are still so
intractable that the seven leaders appear unlikely to achieve agreements capable of significantly shaping Western economic and security affairs over the next year, with the likely exception of an announcement of a new round of trade talks. When the facade of unity has faded, and after the glitter of a joint meeting of Western leaders has receded, heads of state and government will probably find it difficult to preserve the fragile and uncertain consensus that will have been articulated in their final communiqué at Bonn. There will still remain trade imbalances to balance, currency fluctuations to stabilize, and security fears to alleviate. Summits, of course, do not attend to such "details." At best, they phrase a set of questions and envisage a set of answers. How to get from the former to the latter is left to subordinates who, at the end of the Bonn summit, will already be preparing for the next (and perhaps even more contentious) meeting in Japan in 1988.

About the Authors

Simon Serfaty, executive director of The Johns Hopkins Foreign Policy Institute, is a specialist on American and European foreign policy. He has been a guest lecturer in over thirty countries in Africa, Asia, and Western Europe, and he has attended three of the last four summits. His most recent book is American Foreign Policy in a Hostile World: Dangerous Years (1984).

Michael M. Harrison is associate professor of European studies and chairman of the program in advanced industrial societies at SAIS. He is an expert on West European politics and problems of Atlantic security, American foreign policy, and political economy. The title of his most recent book is The Reluctant Ally: France and Atlantic Security (1981).

School of Advanced International Studies

The Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies—SAIS—has achieved worldwide recognition for the scholarly and professional training it provides to men and women planning careers in international service and business. Since its founding in 1945 by a group of American statesmen, it has been a leader in developing an interdisciplinary approach to the study of international politics and economics and in relating the curriculum to current policy issues. It was the first international affairs school to insist that all graduates achieve proficiency in a foreign language.

SAIS became a division of The Johns Hopkins University, one of the United States' pre-eminent academic institutions, in 1950. Today about 320 American and foreign students are enrolled in the two-year Master of Arts degree program in international relations. A small number of students are doctoral candidates and about 50 are mid-career professionals in the Master in International Public Policy program.

The SAIS faculty consists of 28 professors who are known not only for their scholarly accomplishments but for their professional experience in government and the private sector. Over 60 visiting scholars conduct classes at SAIS each year. The language faculty has 24 members, most of whom are native speakers of the languages they teach.

The school has a center in Bologna, Italy, where American and European students study Europe and its relations with the United States and other nations of the world. SAIS will also operate the planned Johns Hopkins-Nanjing University Center for Chinese-American Studies in China.
SAIS PAPERS IN INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

Yuko Matsuyama, A Japanese Journalist Looks at U.S.-Japan Relations, SAIS Paper no. 1 (in cooperation with the Reischauer Center), $12.00.


Nathan A. Pelcovits, Peacekeeping on Arab-Israeli Fronts: Lessons from the Sinai and Lebanon, SAIS Paper no. 3, $10.00.


Harold Brown and Lynn E. Davis, Nuclear Arms Control Choices, SAIS Paper no. 5, $8.00.


Bruce Michael Bagley, Roberto Alvarez, and Katherine J. Hagedorn, eds., Contadora and the Central American and Caribbean Program, $35.00.


To order copies, contact Westview Press, 5500 Central Avenue, Boulder, CO 80301 (303) 444-3541. All prices are subject to change and do not include postage. VISA and Master Card accepted.